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ABSTRACT 
 
Certificate of need (“CON”) programs were conceived approximately fifty years 
ago as supply constraint mechanisms for healthcare services, in an environment that 
is essentially unrecognizable today. Every aspect of the healthcare landscape has 
changed dramatically, particularly in the years since the enactment of the 
Affordable Care Act. The historical rationales in support of CON programs have 
been vigorously questioned by scholars across disciplines, roundly criticized by the 
federal government, and largely disproven by research. Yet the status quo persists 
with thirty-five states retaining CON laws, due in large part to a combination of 
entrenched interests and political inertia that prevents either repeal or significant 
modification. Still, proponents of a more efficient healthcare model need not lose 
hope. Kentucky was widely recognized as among the most successful states in its 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act. As part of its implementation efforts, 
the Commonwealth reformed its CON program to reward healthcare providers 
who embrace rather than resist the changes occasioned by healthcare reform. While 
the eventual impact of Kentucky’s CON modernization cannot yet be known, these 
reforms may offer insights for additional states as they consider whether and how 
to reform their own CON programs. Indeed, rather than being a historic relic that 
                                                                                                                 
I Associate Professor of Law and Gordon D. Schaber Health Law Scholar, University of the Pacific 
McGeorge School of Law; former Executive Director of the Office of Health Policy for the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, a role whose responsibilities included oversight of the Kentucky 
Certificate of Need Program. Many thanks to Cassie Chambers (Harvard Law, 2015) and Mena Arsalai 
(McGeorge Law, 2016) for excellent research assistance. Particular thanks to former colleagues from the 
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modernization of the Kentucky Certificate of Need Program—Audrey Tayse Haynes, Eric Friedlander, 
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visionary leadership of former Governor Steven L. Beshear during the implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act. 
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must be tolerated in the absence of political will for change, it may be possible for a 
modernized CON program to serve as an additional regulatory tool for states 
seeking to nudge their healthcare providers into fuller engagement in the post-
Affordable Care Act healthcare landscape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
CON programs are a powerful force in the majority of states, serving as a 
gatekeeper of the supply of healthcare facilities. In thirty-five states and the District 
of Columbia, providers of at least some healthcare services cannot simply enter a 
market and begin providing the services upon meeting the standards established by 
a state-licensing agency.1 Rather, under state CON laws, providers of healthcare 
services must obtain a permit from the state before offering new services, 
constructing new buildings, or purchasing new medical equipment.2 For example, if 
a hospital wishes to add additional beds to its facility, it must first convince state 
officials that the addition is “needed,” a determination that states make under 
varying theories and evaluation criteria.3 If the state is unpersuaded, the permit is 
denied.4 While these programs have been remarkably persistent,5 the dramatic 
changes in the U.S. healthcare environment following implementation of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act6 present an opportunity for a 
reconsideration of the role of CON in a modern regulatory system. 
When CON programs were first conceived, they were largely envisioned as 
cost-containment mechanisms, slowing healthcare cost increases by preventing 
unfettered entry of new healthcare providers, particularly hospitals.7 Development 
of these programs was heavily influenced by the theory of Milton Roemer that “a 
built bed is a filled bed.”8 Thus, by preventing more beds from being built, and later 
by preventing proliferation of other services deemed “unnecessary,” states—and, for 
a time, the federal government—hoped to slow the alarming rise in healthcare 
expenditures.9 Later, and perhaps in response to criticisms that the programs were 
proving ineffective at achieving meaningful cost containment,10 additional 
                                                                                                                 
1 See Richard Cauchi & Ashley Noble, CON-Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF 
ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-
state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/479B-MFEF]. 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Certificate of Need 
Laws: A Prescription for Higher Costs, ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 50, 50. 
4 Ohlhausen, supra note 3; see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040 (West 2016). 
5 See Lisa Schencker, State Certificate-of-Need Laws Weather Persistent Attacks, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 23, 2016), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160123/MAGAZINE/301239964 
[https://perma.cc/26VY-EDAE]. 
6 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of Title 26 and 42 of the U.S.C.). 
7 See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
8 Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 88 (2015); see also 
Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue 
Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 253 (1980). 
9 Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
10 E.g., Bagley, supra note 8, at 89. 
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justifications for the programs became prevalent, such as ensuring an adequate 
distribution of healthcare services across geographic areas and socioeconomic 
groups, providing states a regulatory lever to require that healthcare providers 
deliver sufficient and quality care for the indigent.11 Supporters of CON also 
correctly point to the fact that the market for healthcare services is not a normal 
market, which may justify different and more stringent regulatory interventions 
than in the case of an efficient market.12 For example, consumption of healthcare 
services cannot be viewed as similar to consumption of a normal consumer 
product—most healthcare services are ordered for patients (e.g., surgery, imaging), 
and patients do not “shop” for these services like they do for other goods and 
services.13 Proponents also argue that CON laws do not block change entirely; 
rather, their primary value is to provide a formal role for evaluation by the state and 
participation in the evaluation process by other interested stakeholders.14  
Those opposed to CON programs are vehement in their criticism, arguing that 
by limiting new entrants to the market, CON programs reduce price competition 
between facilities and may in fact promote a higher cost trajectory than would exist 
without the laws.15 Moreover, opponents argue that the virtual elimination of the 
“cost plus” pricing system in effect when CON laws were first enacted, in which 
hospitals were reimbursed under a formula that paid them, in essence, the cost of 
delivering a service plus a small percentage of profit, renders CON laws irrelevant 
in the modern healthcare delivery system.16 Opponents also point to inconsistencies 
in administration of CON programs by state officials, as well as the potential for 
applications to be granted on the basis of political influence, institutional prestige, 
or other factors apart from the “need” for a service or the interests of the 
community.17 Moreover, opponents question whether state policymakers are best 
situated to determine the best interests of a community and whether a particular 
provider should be permitted to offer healthcare services in a given area.18 
                                                                                                                 
11 James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities 
to State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025, 1030—31, 1031 n.25 (1986). 
12 See, e.g., Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
13 Id. Although there is a considerable movement to create the tools to enable patients to shop and 
to compare health services among providers based on cost and quality, thus far, these new technologies 
have had only a small impact on consumer behavior. See, e.g., Price Transparency Initiatives for 
Patients, COUNTY HEALTH RANKINGS & ROADMAPS, 
http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/policies/price-transparency-initiatives-patients 
[https://perma.cc/C3EW-RHZT] (last updated Nov. 18, 2015). 
14 Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
15 Id. 
16 Matthew D. Mitchell, Do Certificate-of-Need Laws Limit Spending? 10 (Mercatus Ctr., 
Working Paper, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-mitchell-con-healthcare-
spending-v1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/U479-8W3B]. 
17 Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
18 Id. 
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The evidence for the effectiveness of CON programs at achieving any of their 
identified policy objectives is weak.19 Moreover, considerable evidence exists to 
raise a serious question as to whether CON programs do more harm than good in 
the healthcare markets in which they operate.20 For example, some studies show 
that patients are at higher risk when undergoing certain procedures in CON states 
than in non-CON states.21 Legal and policy scholars have been fairly unrestrained 
in their criticism of CON programs, noting the potential for regulatory capture by 
entrenched incumbent providers and the increasing irrelevance of CON laws in a 
dramatically altered reimbursement environment for healthcare providers.22 And 
although the federal government actively supported—and in effect, required—
states to enact CON laws for a brief period in the 1970s and 1980s, it has since 
changed its views. Now, the federal government routinely questions whether states 
should maintain CON laws, frequently offering comments from the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division as 
states evaluate changes to or repeal their laws.23 Despite the strong and persistent 
criticism leveled by scholars, researchers, and policymakers over the past decades, 
CON programs have endured, remaining in effect in varying strength and breadth 
in thirty-five states and the District of Columbia.24 And the repeal movement has 
been stalled for at least the past fifteen years—no state has fully repealed its 
program since Indiana in 1999.25 
It is not for want of attempts to challenge that CON programs have endured.26 
Many frustrated healthcare providers, sometimes supported by organizations 
favoring more free market competition, have challenged CON laws under various 
constitutional theories, including the Commerce Clause, equal protection, and due 
process.27 Those challenges have almost uniformly failed, except in the case of 
                                                                                                                 
19 See Bagley, supra note 8, at 89. 
20 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission & Department of Justice, to Illinois Task Force on 
Health Planning Reform, Agencies Say CON Laws Undercut Consumer Choice, Stifle Innovation and 
Weaken Markets Ability to Contain Healthcare Costs (Sept. 12, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2008/09/federal-trade-commission-department-justice-issue-joint-statement 
[https://perma.cc/W2RE-32YU]. 
21 See infra Subsection III.C.i. (describing research regarding impact of CON laws on quality of 
care). 
22 See infra Section II.B. 
23 See infra Section III.A. (discussing the federal government’s criticism of CON programs). 
24 See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
25 See Schencker, supra note 5. Note, however, that New Hampshire ended its Certificate of Need 
board in 2016, but it is questionable whether the end of the CON board should be considered a full 
repeal of CON in light of the ongoing CON-like oversight of new healthcare services by the New 
Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services. See Bob Sanders, State Pulls Plug on New 
Hampshire Certificate of Need Board, N.H. BUS. REV. (June 15, 2016), http://www.nhbr.com/June-
24-2016/State-pulls-plug-on-NH-Certificate-of-Need-board/ [https://perma.cc/T9V4-YTHV]. 
26 Id. 
27 See infra Part IV. (discussing, among others, Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 813 
F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2016) and Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
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documented and significant discriminatory effect of the laws toward out-of-state 
healthcare providers,28 or where CON laws infringed on a fundamental right like a 
woman’s ability to access abortion services.29 
In view of the persistence of CON laws and the political inertia that prevents 
their repeal, legislators and policymakers must think creatively about strategies to 
evolve these programs to meet the challenges presented by the new healthcare 
environment. In particular, the Affordable Care Act has dramatically altered the 
delivery and payment landscapes for all healthcare providers, and these are changes 
that seem virtually certain to remain regardless of the different directions healthcare 
reform may proceed after the administration of President Barack Obama.30 
Kentucky was widely recognized as among the most successful states in the country 
for its implementation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) under former 
Governor Steven L. Beshear.31 Indeed, with over 570,000 additional individuals 
obtaining Medicaid and a drop in the Commonwealth’s uninsured rate from 16% 
prior to the ACA to 8% at the end of 2014,32 some of the reasons for CON, such 
as ensuring that existing providers retain sufficient ability to deliver care to the 
uninsured, must be reexamined.33 This paper uses the experience of Kentucky in 
modernizing its CON program following implementation of the ACA as a case 
study, drawing lessons that may have further application as other states consider 
reforms to their programs.34 In particular, as part of its reform process, Kentucky 
appears to be the first state to have adopted explicit preferences in its CON 
program for providers who meet objective quality thresholds under federal 
government quality rankings, as well as preferences for providers who participate in 
so-called “value-based payment” programs, which seek to reward healthcare 
providers who deliver high-value care to patients.35 In addition, Kentucky’s 
reformed CON program requires new providers to adopt electronic medical records 
and participate in its health information exchange, with the goal of improving the 
ability of healthcare providers to coordinate patient care.36 These elements of the 
revision process may be appropriate for duplication or adaptation in other state 
                                                                                                                 
28 See infra Part IV. (discussing legal challenges to CON laws). 
29 Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 1997). 
Moreover, in view of the recent Supreme Court decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 
S. Ct. 2292 (2016), CON laws impacting the right to abortion and other reproductive freedoms may be 
ripe for new challenge.  
30 See Bagley, supra note 8, at 62–68.  
31 Samantha Artiga, et al., Implementation of the ACA in Kentucky: Lessons Learned to Date and 
the Potential Effects of Future Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (April 2016), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-implementation-of-the-aca-in-kentucky-lessons-learned-to-
date-and-the-potential-effects-of-future-changes [https://perma.cc/3W97-R5N2] (“Kentucky has had 
one of the most successful ACA implementation experiences among states.”). 
32 Id. at 1–2. 
33 E.g., Simpson, supra note 11, at 1031–32. 
34 See infra Part V. 
35 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E, §§ I.C., III.A., III.B., V.B. (2016). 
36 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016). 
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programs, as states consider which of their regulatory levers they can use to help 
shape a more effective, efficient healthcare delivery system.  
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the evolution of CON programs, 
from the early experiments in health system planning following World War II 
through the CON programs in place today. Part III describes the longstanding 
federal government skepticism toward CON programs and the views of law and 
policy scholars as to the effectiveness of CON laws, and then considers the 
evidence of the impact of CON laws on cost, quality and access, as well as evidence 
regarding the political influence that permeates the programs. Part IV evaluates the 
nearly uniform failure of legal challenges to CON laws. Part V offers the 
experience of Kentucky in modernizing its CON program as a case study in the 
evolution of CON programs to meet the demands of a post-Affordable Care Act 
healthcare ecosystem. Part VI concludes this discussion. 
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAMS 
 
A. Early Iterations of Certificate of Need 
 
CON programs are a powerful force in the majority of states, serving as a 
gatekeeper to the supply of healthcare facilities.37 Under CON laws, healthcare 
facilities are required to obtain a permit from state health planning entities before 
offering new services, constructing new buildings, or purchasing new medical 
equipment.38 For example, if a hospital wishes to add additional beds to its facility, 
it must seek approval from the state, which will evaluate the request based on a 
determination of, at minimum, whether there exists sufficient public “need” for the 
new beds.39 If the state determines that the need for the requested facility is not 
proven, the permit is denied.40 Beyond need, which is usually determined either in 
whole or in part by reference to a numeric formula,41 additional review criteria may 
exist, including accessibility, costs, feasibility, available economic resources, quality, 
and others.42 
Others have written comprehensively about the history of the development of 
CON programs in the United States, and this Article will not duplicate that 
work.43 However, an understanding of the underlying rationale for CON and 
changes in the programs over time is essential to understanding their place in the 
modern healthcare delivery system. In most instances, the government allows 
market forces to determine the appropriate supply of a product, and consumers to 
                                                                                                                 
37 See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
38 Id. 
39 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
40 See supra note 3–4 and accompanying text. 
41 See, e.g., KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016). 
42 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(2)(a)(2) (West 2016). 
43 See generally Simpson, supra note 11; Payton & Powsner, supra note 8. 
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purchase the amount of that product that meets their needs.44 However, the market 
for healthcare services is not a normal market, and it is this recognition that led to 
the development of health planning authorities and ultimately to CON programs.45  
Following the end of World War II, “faced with the aging infrastructure of a 
healthcare system ill-equipped to accommodate the needs of returning soldiers and 
the inevitable baby boom that followed,”46 Congress passed the Hospital Survey 
and Construction Act (the “Hill-Burton Act,” or the “Act”), which was designed to 
promote public and nonprofit hospital construction and modernization, primarily 
through the availability of federal funding for certain healthcare facility 
construction and modernization projects.47 As described in its statement of 
purpose, the Hill-Burton Act included a health planning function, as the Act was 
intended to assist states: 
 
[I]nventory their existing hospitals . . . to survey the need for 
construction of hospitals, and to develop programs for 
construction of such public and other nonprofit hospitals as will, 
in conjunction with existing facilities, afford the necessary 
physical facilities for furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and 
similar services to all their people . . . .48 
 
As Nicholas Bagley recently observed, although the scope of the Hill-Burton 
Act increased rapidly throughout the 1960s, the health planning in this era “lacked 
regulatory bite,” as planning agencies could advocate for particular facilities and 
services to be provided, but could not compel the private sector to build facilities or 
provide the needed services.49 At approximately the same time, increasing health 
sector costs led government officials to look to additional strategies to regulate 
costs, including by instituting CON programs to constrain facility supply as a cost 
control mechanism, an approach heavily influenced by theory of Milton Roemer 
that “[a] built bed is a filled bed.”50 Under Roemer’s Law, there exists a direct 
correlation between capacity and utilization; when combined with the availability of 
third-party reimbursement, oversupply of resources will create its own demand for 
                                                                                                                 
44 See Bagley, supra note 8, at 71–74. 
45 Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
46 Carol Brayshaw Longwell & James T. Steele, Jr., The Rise and Fall of Certificate of Need in 
Pennsylvania: An Experiment in Healthcare Planning and the Role of the Commonwealth Court, 21 
WIDENER L.J. 185, 186 (2011). 
47 Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, tit. VI, 60 Stat. 1040, 1041–49 
(1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2016)); see also The Hill-Burton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in 
the Delivery of Healthcare to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316, 316 (1979). 
48 See Hospital Survey and Construction Act § 601(a); see also Bagley, supra note 8, at 85–90 
(2015) (discussing the evolution of state health facility supply planning). 
49 Bagley, supra note 8, at 87–88. 
50 Milton I. Roemer, M.D., Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Experiment, J. AM. 
HOSP. ASS’N, Nov. 1, 1961, at 36, 36; see also Bagley, supra note 8, at 88.  
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excessive use.51 Thus, to prevent both overutilization of services and to control 
costs, supply constraints effected through CON programs were not only justifiable 
but actively supported by federal and state policymakers.52 
In 1966, New York became the first state to establish a CON program, 
requiring state approval for construction of hospital and nursing home 
construction, and was quickly followed by twenty states over the next six years.53 
The federal government soon followed suit and in recognition of the contribution 
of the “massive infusion of Federal funds into the existing healthcare system” to 
“inflationary increases in the cost of healthcare” and the “fail[ure] to produce an 
adequate supply or distribution of health resources,” Congress passed the National 
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (“NHPRDA”).54 
NHPRDA provided significant funding for state health planning activities and 
“effectively required states to adopt certificate of need laws conforming to federal 
standards.”55 By 1980, every state except Louisiana had a CON program.56  
Beyond their core supply constraint function, state CON programs often 
contain additional regulatory goals, including promotion and preservation of high 
quality healthcare services—which, as others have observed, is closely related to 
cost containment given the documented correlation between sufficient volume of 
services and quality of care.57 Some CON programs also contain general goals or 
specific review criteria regarding adequate distribution of services among 
geographic areas as well as social and economic groups—for example, some CON 
programs require applicants to demonstrate a plan for the provision of charity 
care.58 Additional policy goals may include reducing state expenditures on public 
programs, such as by limiting the number of nursing home beds (nursing home 
care is primarily funded through the Medicaid program), and ensuring the state 
                                                                                                                 
51 John Steen, The Dartmouth Atlas on Roemer’s Law, DARTMOUTH ATLAS (2008) 
http://www.ahpanet.org/files/TheDartmouthAtlasonRoemer'sLaw%20b.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R8N-
CE6J]. 
52 An alternative theory of the evolution of CON programs was posited by Sallyanne Payton and 
Rhoda M. Powsner, who wrote that Blue Cross and leading public and private health officials promoted 
CON in the late 1950s with goals to “(1) to restore public confidence [that had eroded with rising costs] 
in the voluntary hospitals and their financing arm, the Blue Cross . . . ; (2) to protect the dominance of 
the existing large voluntary teaching hospitals; and (3) to channel hospital growth in the developing 
suburbs into large, full-service, general hospitals.” Payton & Powsner, supra note 8, at 204. 
53 Simpson, supra note 11, at 1036. 
54 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–641, 88 
Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 43 U.S.C. 300k). 
55 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 1026; see also National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974. 
56 See Matthew Mitchell & Christopher Koopman, 40 Years of Certificate-of-Need Laws Across 
America, MERCATUS CTR. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/40-years-
certificate-need-laws-across-america [https://perma.cc/6AS-DGMD]. 
57 See Simpson, supra note 11, at 1029–30. 
58 See id. at 1030–32, 1031 n.25. 
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maintains a role in large health policy decisions impacting state residents, such as 
the location of a new hospital.59 
While laudable in intent, CON programs were largely perceived as falling short 
of expectations by the early 1980s, particularly as a deregulatory political climate 
prevailed.60 Costs continued to escalate, and a number of studies found that CON 
programs did not help contain healthcare expenditures.61 Moreover, as larger and 
more influential healthcare entities learned to navigate the often complicated and 
bureaucratic programs, perceptions of protectionism of incumbents further 
undermined support for CON.62 Congress, too, became skeptical of the benefits of 
CON and repealed NHPRDA in 1987.63 By 1990, eleven states repealed their 
programs, and by 2000 a total of fourteen states had repealed their CON laws.64  
 
B. The Stagnant Status Quo 
 
Although many states repealed their programs following the repeal of the 
federal mandate, the trend toward full repeal has stalled. The last two states to 
repeal their programs were Indiana (1999) and Wisconsin (2000), although 
Wisconsin reinstated its program in 2011.65 And in some sectors of healthcare, 
regulation via CON remains quite strong. For example, a 2004 study examined 
state policies for CON or moratoria for new building, renovation, and remodeling 
of long-term care providers, surveying state officials over a twelve year period from 
1990–2002.66 By 2002, the study found that the vast majority of states still 
regulated the supply of nursing homes, hospital-based nursing homes, and facilities 
for the developmentally disabled.67 In addition, the study found that “18 percent of 
states regulate the supply of residential care facilities, 35 percent regulate home 
                                                                                                                 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 1026–27 (describing deregulatory goals of the administration of President Ronald 
Reagan). 
61 See, e.g., Christopher J. Conover & Frank A. Sloan, Does Removing Certificate-of-Need 
Regulations Lead to a Surge in Healthcare Spending?, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 455, 456 
(1998). 
62 See Bagley, supra note 8, at 86 (citing Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation 
Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 
233 (1980)). 
63 See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 
Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k-300n-6 (1982)), amended by Health Planning and 
Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), repealed by Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986). 
64 Mitchell & Koopman, supra note 56. 
65 Id. However, see supra note 26 for a description of New Hamphire’s 2016 termination of its 
CON board. 
66 Charlene Harrington, et al., Trends in State Certificate of Need and Moratoria Programs for 
Long-Term Care Providers 19 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL’Y 31, 31 (2004). 
67 Id. 
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health agencies, and 37 percent regulate hospices.”68 In line with the traditional 
bases for CON programs, the authors found that the CON programs were based 
primarily based on strategies seeking cost containment and the appropriate 
distribution of services.69 The authors cautioned, however, that CON programs 
that placed limits on home and community service providers could negatively 
impact access to care.70 
While CON remains prevalent, there continues to be vigorous debate over the 
wisdom of these programs in states at all points along the political spectrum. In 
recent years, several states have reexamined the efficacy of the CON system and 
proposed modifications to existing CON programs. In 2009, half of the thirty-six 
states with CON programs had bills to repeal or reform these programs introduced 
in their state legislatures.71 Illinois attempted significant reform that year, but those 
efforts resulted in fairly modest change.72 Fascinatingly, and relevant to the 
discussion of political influence in CON, manipulation of the CON process was 
one of the alleged corrupt activities that led to the removal of former Governor Rod 
Blagojevich from office and his ultimate indictment on charges of fraud, extortion 
and racketeering.73 In a dramatic twist, Pamela Davis, a hospital CEO whose 
project had been stalled under the review process, wore a wire to assist the FBI in 
its investigation.74  
Around the same time in Alaska and Hawaii, Governors Sarah Palin and Linda 
Lingle attempted to repeal their states’ CON laws, but neither succeeded.75 And in 
2008, Florida Governor Charlie Crist began an attempt to terminate the program 
but ultimately compromised on a reform bill in lieu of repeal.76 Beyond full repeal, 
the National Conference of State Legislatures reported that CON-related bills 
were also introduced in 2009 in seventeen additional states.77 In Alabama, a bill to 
                                                                                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 31–32. 
70 Id. at 32. 
71 See Andis Robeznieks, Pros and CONs: Certificate-of-Need Reform Bills See Mixed Results, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (April 27, 2009), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090427/MAGAZINE/904249983 
[https://perma.cc/2RJT-LYDH].  
72 See Legal Alert from McGuire Woods, Illinois Certificate of Need: A New Majority of Five, 
MCGUIREWOODS 
(June 2, 2010), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2010/6/Illinois-
Certificate-of-Need-A-New-Majority-of-Five.aspx [https://perma.cc/RT6L-XQJX].  
73 Robeznieks, supra note 71. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. Interestingly, although the repeal efforts were—and continue to be—mostly led by 
Republican governors, the reform efforts appear to be more bipartisan. In 2009, the seventeen states in 
which bills were introduced were: Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Virginia and Washington. Id. 
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repeal CON was unsuccessful in the face of robust opposition from the state’s 
hospital association.78 In Oregon, the Association of Hospitals and Health Systems 
broke with most hospital associations and took the relative outlier position that 
“certificate of need is a failed experiment in regulating construction.”79 Nonetheless, 
the association opposed two bills introduced to slightly modify the CON process, 
preferring its own legislation, which it characterized as an approach that relied 
more on transparency through disclosure rather than regulation.80 While no repeal 
efforts have succeeded since 1999, several states have undertaken smaller reform 
efforts, focusing on piecemeal changes to CON programs, such as exempting 
certain types of medical services from CON requirements.81 In 2009, several states 
passed small reforms to their CON systems, including New Jersey, Maryland, 
Washington, and West Virginia.82 Other states, including Connecticut, Illinois, 
and Georgia, have also reformed their CON programs in recent years.83  
These efforts at CON reform have continued in the post-Affordable Care Act 
era. For example, the North Carolina state legislature recently considered a bill that 
would have exempted certain ambulatory surgical centers from obtaining a CON.84 
Although the session expired without a vote on the CON legislation, several 
members of the legislature expressed support for continued reform efforts.85 And in 
2013, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley vetoed the $2 million allocated in the 
state budget for the CON program.86 Although the state legislature sustained 
Haley’s veto, several hospitals sued the state.87 These hospitals argued that Haley 
was improperly using her veto to eliminate the CON program, and that her actions 
had exceeded her executive authority.88 The legal battle eventually reached the 
state’s Supreme Court, which ruled that the state had to continue to administer the 
CON program.89  
                                                                                                                 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Tracy Yee, et al., Healthcare Certificate-of-Need Laws: Policy or Politics?, NAT'L INST. FOR 
HEALTHCARE REFORM: RES. BRIEF, no. 4, May 2011, at 1, 7, http://nihcr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/NIHCR_Research_Brief_No._4.pdf [https://perma.cc/34VB-EPZ6]. 
82 See Robeznieks, supra note 71.  
83 Yee, supra note 81, at 6. 
84 Rose Hoban, Bill to Revise Hospital Rules Dies in Subcommittee, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 
24, 2014), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2014/04/24/bill-to-revise-hospital-rules-dies-in-
subcommittee/. 
85 Id. 
86 Meg Kinnard, South Carolina Supreme Court Won’t Review Certificate of Need Ruling, POST 
AND COURIER (June 2, 2014, 11:49 AM), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20140602/PC1610/140609889/south-carolina-supreme-court-
wont-review-certificate-of-need-ruling [https://perma.cc/L3L6-D7E3].  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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As of 2016, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have CON programs 
of varying depth and scope.90 Of the states that retain CON programs, the most 
heavily regulated services are long-term care and nursing home beds (35 plus 
D.C.), acute hospital beds (27), ambulatory surgical centers (26), cardiac 
catherization (25), long-term acute care (25 plus D.C.), psychiatric services (25), 
open heart surgery (24), rehabilitation (24), and neo-natal intensive care (22).91  
 
II. SKEPTICISM TOWARD CERTIFICATE OF NEED FROM ALL QUARTERS 
 
A. Longstanding Federal Government Skepticism Toward Certificate of Need 
 
Although the decision whether to maintain a CON program has been the 
prerogative of the states since the repeal of NHPRDA in 1987, the federal 
government has not been neutral on the issue. Rather, for at least the past fifteen 
years, the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division have taken an active position 
against the continuance of CON programs. 
For example, the FTC and DOJ issued statements to the Illinois Task Force on 
Health Planning Reform;92 the General Assembly and the Senate of the state of 
Georgia;93 the Committee on Health, Education and Social Services of the Alaska 
House of Representatives;94 and the Florida Senate Committee on Health and 
                                                                                                                 
90 See CON—Certificate of Need Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/T4UX-
8ME3]. 
91 See infra Table 1. 
92 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE AND 
CERTIFICATES OF NEED: JOINT STATEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BEFORE THE ILLINOIS TASK 
FORCE ON HEALTH PLANNING REFORM (2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-and-department-justice-
written-testimony-illinois-task-force-health-planning-reform-concerning/v080018illconlaws.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6T3L-9WER].  
93 Competition in Healthcare and Certificates of Need, Before a Joint Session of the Health and 
Human Services Committee of the State Senate and the CON Special Committee of the State House 
of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia (Ga. 2007) (statement of Mark J. 
Botti, Litigation I Section Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), http://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-
healthcare-and-certificates-need [https://perma.cc/3UXY-ZBDN]. 
94 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Standing Committee on 
Health, Education, and Social Services of the Alaska House of Representatives on House Bill 337, "An 
Act Establishing the Alaska Healthcare Information Office; Relating to Healthcare Planning and 
Information; Relating to the Certificate of Need Program for Certain Healthcare Facilities; and 
Providing for an Effective Date" (Al. 2008) (statement of U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-written-testimony-alaska-
house-representatives-concerning-alaska-certificate-need-laws/v080007alaska.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89PZ-YEE5]. 
                                            KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                        Vol. I05 
 
216 
Human Services Appropriations,95 in each instance reiterating the government’s 
position that CON laws undercut consumer choice, stifle innovation and weaken 
the market forces that could otherwise operate to help promote competition and 
potentially reduce the growth rate of healthcare expenditures. In the joint 
statements, the agencies opine that CON laws impede the efficient performance of 
healthcare markets by creating barriers to entry and expansion, to the detriment of 
healthcare competition and consumers.96 The agencies cite economic research on 
the effects of CON laws, as well as some of the well-known risks that CON laws 
entail. For example, the agencies observe that in addition to limiting entry, CON 
laws create opportunities for existing competitors to exploit the CON process to 
thwart or delay new competition; they can facilitate anticompetitive agreements 
among providers; and, as noted by a number of researchers who interviewed former 
state CON officials, the CON process itself may be susceptible to corruption.97 
In the joint statements, the agencies also evaluate several arguments in support 
of CON laws, noting that the original cost-control reasons for CON laws no 
longer apply and that CON laws are an ineffective means by which to fund 
indigent care.98 For these reasons, the agencies encourage states that continue to 
require certificates of need to consider whether such laws do more harm than 
good.99 In addition to participating in individual state deliberations about the future 
of CON programs, in 2004 the agencies took the additional step of issuing a joint 
report entitled “Improving Healthcare: A Dose of Competition,” in which they 
were unrestrained in their criticism of CON laws:  
 
The Agencies believe that, on balance, CON programs are not 
successful in containing healthcare costs, and that they pose 
serious anticompetitive risks that usually outweigh their 
purported economic benefits. Market incumbents can too easily 
use CON procedures to forestall competitors from entering the 
incumbent’s market. . . . Indeed, there is considerable evidence 
that CON programs can actually increase prices by fostering 
anticompetitive barriers to entry.100 
                                                                                                                 
95 Competition in Healthcare and Certificates of Need, Statement of the Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice Before the Florida Senate Committee on Health and Human Services 
Appropriations (Fl. 2008) (statement of Joseph M. Miller, Litigation Section Assistant Chief, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2008/06/09/233821.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UZM3-3NV2]. 
96 See supra notes 92–95. 
97 See supra notes 92–95.  
98 See supra notes 92–95. 
99 See supra notes 92–95.  
100 DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTHCARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION 22 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-
care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-
justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/V24T-6L9U]. 
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In 2015 the agencies issued a joint statement in Virginia, in which they address 
several concerns about CON programs.101 First, the agencies observe that CON 
laws create barriers to entry, thereby suppressing competition, reducing the ability 
of markets to respond to demand for innovative and higher-quality and lower cost 
treatments, and shielding incumbent providers from competition from new 
entrants.102 Moreover, as the agencies observe, CON laws may further harm 
competition because competing healthcare providers may take advantage of the 
CON process to protect their businesses by using the CON process (e.g., filing 
comments, objecting to a competitor’s application) to slow or thwart a competitor’s 
attempt to enter the market.103 Third, and perhaps most significantly from the 
agencies’ perspective, CON laws can “entrench anticompetitive mergers by limiting 
the ability to implement effective structural remedies.”104 Drawing on the recent 
experience of the FTC in FTC v. Phoebe Putney which involved a challenge to the 
merger of two hospitals in Albany, Georgia,105 the agencies note that the FTC was 
precluded by Georgia’s CON laws from obtaining a remedy that would have 
restored competition to the marketplace following a merger that created a 
monopoly on certain services in Albany.106 The FTC noted that the case “illustrates 
how state CON laws, despite their original and laudable goal of reducing 
healthcare facility costs, often act as a barrier to entry to the detriment of 
competition and healthcare consumers.”107 Thus, the agencies conclude that the 
Virginia working group studying the state’s CON laws should carefully consider 
whether and under what circumstances the laws should be retained.108 
The agencies have also acted independently from one another in voicing 
concern over CON laws. For example, in 2008, the DOJ sent a letter to the 
Michigan Certificate of Need Commission warning against proposed standards for 
proton beam therapy because of the harm the CON program could have on 
competition and on consumers.109 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has 
                                                                                                                 
101 FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T. OF JUSTICE: ANTITRUST DIV., JOINT STATEMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE TO THE VIRGINIA CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED WORK GROUP 1–2 (2015), 
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105 F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1008 (2013). 
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107 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Senator Michael Bishop, Senate Majority Leader (June 6, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/comments-
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published staff statements before several states reiterating its position in favor of 
full repeal of CON laws.110 And, as described in Section III.B., current FTC 
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen penned a 2015 article in which she vigorously 
questioned the ability of CON programs to deliver on any of their enumerated 
policy objectives.111 
 
B. Criticism of Certificate of Need From Scholars Across Disciplines 
 
Among academic scholars, it is rare to find ardent, or even lukewarm defenders 
of CON programs. Although the arguments for the effectiveness of CON have not 
                                                                                                                 
110 Certificate of Need Regulation of Healthcare Facilities: Prepared Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission Before North Carolina State Goals and Policy Board, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1, 2 
(Mar. 6, 1989) (“To promote competition in healthcare markets, the Federal Trade Commission and its 
staff have been active both in antitrust law enforcement and in advocacy of regulatory reforms, including 
advocating the repeal of Certificate of Need regulation . . . .”), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-north-
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outright repeal of CON regulation proposed in LB 745 would likely best serve the interests of 
healthcare consumers, we believe that passage of either of the other CON reform bills would likely also 
have significant positive effects on healthcare markets.”), 
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Dir., Cleveland Reg’l Office, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John F. Pressman & Donald W. Snyder, Pa. State 
Representatives, at 14 (Mar. 30, 1988) (“We believe that the continued existence of CON regulation 
would be contrary to the interests of healthcare consumers in Pennsylvania.”), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
hon.john.f.pressman-and-hon.donald-w.snyder-concerning-pennsylvania-h.b.1328-repeal-certificate-
need-process/v880012.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4SM-6JBJ]; Letter from John M. Mendenhall, Acting 
Dir., Cleveland Reg’l Office, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Gerald H. Law, Mich. State Representative, at 14 
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https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-hon.gerald-
h.law-concerning-certificate-need-laws/v880007.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5NH-3YAU]; Letter from 
Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Maston T. Jacks, Esq., 
Chairman, Comm'n on Med. Facilities Certificate of Pub. Need, Commonwealth of Va., at 1 (Aug. 6, 
1987) (“[W]e believe that CON regulation is unlikely to benefit healthcare consumers in Virginia, and 
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https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-virginia-
commission-medical-facilities-concerning-reform-certificate-need/v870014.pdf 
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been conclusively disproven,112 the prevailing view reflects considerable skepticism 
about the ability of CON programs to achieve any of their intended aims. And 
even when the programs were at their most popular, many were questioning 
whether CON programs could truly deliver the benefits they promised. 
In 1973, a time when CON programs were very much in vogue, Clark 
Havinghurst noted that it was “appropriate to inquire whether there is a realistic 
basis for expecting desirable results from introducing such regulatory controls in the 
market for health services.”113 While acknowledging the facially persuasive nature 
of the arguments in favor of CON programs,114 he nonetheless noted that at their 
core, CON programs are attempts to address symptoms rather than root causes of 
the underlying problems of escalating cost and utilization.115 Havinghurst correctly 
observed that the rationale for CON programs depended on the “continued 
predominance of financing mechanisms which encourage inefficiency both by 
guaranteeing recovery of costs, no matter how great, and by externalizing the costs 
of doctors’ and patients’ consumption decisions.”116 When compared to the 
potential for truly disruptive change in the healthcare delivery system, CON 
programs could be viewed as “conservative measures, designed to preserve the very 
institutions which create the problems to which they are addressed.”117 While he 
acknowledged similarities of the certificate of need process and its underlying 
theories supporting regulation to the “public utility” model of healthcare regulation 
espoused by some, Havinghurst suggested that CON programs were unlikely to be 
“appreciably effective” controlling costs due to the “practically unavoidable slippage 
involved in translating a persuasive rationale for regulation into a workable 
regulatory program.”118 Moreover, he noted that negative impacts associated with 
the interference with normal market forces, such as delays in innovation or 
reductions in efficiency, might outweigh the limited benefits CON programs could 
provide.119  
Many others were equally skeptical of the benefits of CON programs, at least as 
they were administered in practice. By 1986, a number of states had repealed their 
CON programs, in part in response to the institution of the Medicare prospective 
                                                                                                                 
112 See infra Section III.C. 
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payment system (providers were essentially paid a set fee for their services rather 
than a cost-based rate) and the increase in enrollment in health maintenance 
organizations, whose business model contained independent incentives for cost 
containment.120 Simpson noted that in making the decision to repeal their CON 
programs, states expressed “exasperation with the controversy that often surrounds 
certificate of need decisions.”121 Indeed, it appeared that Havinghurst’s caution 
about the distinction between CON programs as envisioned and as actually 
administered was leading to skepticism as to the value the programs added to the 
healthcare delivery system. The debate continued in subsequent decades, with no 
resolution. 
In 1993, one of the few defenders of CON, Robert Hackey of the University of 
Massachusetts, acknowledged the rampant criticism of CON programs over the 
prior decade, but argued that more recent evidence suggested that CON programs 
“may be more effective than commonly believed.”122 While acknowledging that 
CON programs had not been shown to lower healthcare costs, Hackey argued that 
the expectations for meaningful cost control had always been unrealistic in relation 
to what the programs could actually deliver, placing a portion of the blame on the 
federal government’s overly heavy reliance on indirect cost containment strategies 
like CON (as a tool to reduce capital expenditures by hospitals) rather than more 
direct strategies like rate setting by regulation.123 Moreover, Hackey was an early 
proponent of broadening the goals of CON programs beyond cost containment to 
include additional policy objectives, such as increasing access to care for the 
indigent and increasing lay participation in health policy planning.124 Thus, rather 
than viewing CON as a failed experiment in cost containment, Hackey 
optimistically concluded that CON programs could assume a broader role in the 
1990s as additional policy objectives were incorporated into the programs.125 By 
1998, writing with Peter Fuller, Hackey was more tempered in his views, 
acknowledging that in neighboring state Rhode Island, the ability of the CON 
program to achieve its goals had been hampered by a number of factors, including 
significant resource disparities between the state agency and the private entities that 
sought approval for new projects.126 Nonetheless, he maintained that Rhode 
Island’s CON program, if appropriately funded and supported by leadership in the 
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legislative and executive branches, could still offer the state a valuable mechanism 
by which to shape the organization and delivery of healthcare services.127 
There do not appear to be many other researchers who shared Hackey’s 
optimistic views. Rather, the prevailing view seems to have been steadily mounting 
criticism of CON laws. For example, in 1995, as Connecticut was considering 
abolishing its CON program, Quinnipiac Law Professor W. John Thomas urged 
the General Assembly to terminate the program on the grounds that during the 
two decades in which Connecticut had CON in place, there had been “a wealth of 
empirical studies indicating that such laws do not produce economic savings,” 
studies which also “produced little evidence to suggest that CON laws have a 
positive effect on either the quality of or access to healthcare.”128 
In addition, by the mid 1990s, as managed healthcare companies became 
increasingly prevalent in the insurance market, there were increasing questions as to 
the relevance of CON under this new payment system. After all, if the purpose of 
managed care was in fact to manage both care and cost by negotiating lower rates 
with providers and ensuring appropriate utilization, what additional value would 
CON bring? In a 1995 note, Patrick McGinley argued for the repeal of Florida’s 
CON law on the grounds that its recently instituted managed competition system 
rendered the CON program moot, and indeed, that the continuance of the CON 
program risked the failure of Florida’s managed competition strategy.129 McGinley 
argued that if hospitals were protected from competition by CON laws, managed 
healthcare companies would be severely hamstrung in their ability to negotiate 
more favorable rates.130  
In 2001, as Illinois policymakers were engaged in debate about a controversial 
hospital expansion project, state government attorney Lauretta Higgins Wolfson 
explicitly questioned whether the Illinois CON process had become so tainted by 
politics that it ought to be abolished.131 Wolfson observed that “[h]ospitals and 
market players have accused [the issuing entity] of being politically influenced . . . 
and . . . influenced by lobbyists rather than healthcare needs.”132 Indeed, some 
contemporaneous critics in the national debate alleged that “the process of 
obtaining a CON has become an enterprise in itself ‘...becoming so lucrative that it 
attracts many politicians and former politicians who successfully use their influence 
to weight the process for those who employ their services.’”133 Wolfson concluded 
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that in Illinois, “[a]n analysis of CON theory and practices clearly shows that 
important public health decisions are being made by an entrenched group of men 
and women, virtually unknown and accountable to no one,” and called for change 
in the form of research studies to evaluate the premises underlying CON 
programs.134 Moreover, Wolfson argued that in the event the program remained, it 
would require considerable administrative simplification along with a removal of 
political influence and the resulting appearance of impropriety.135 
A 2007 study assessing the perception of Maryland’s CON program through a 
small-scale survey of hospital administrators found mixed results.136 While 
acknowledging that the survey participants tended to report agreement with the 
position of their facilities as a CON facility, the authors found that respondents 
tended to agree there was a relationship between patient volumes and the quality of 
care.137 More interestingly, the survey respondents agreed that CON decisions were 
influenced by politics, and that the public plays an insignificant role in decision 
making.138 Even with those shortcomings in the program, respondents were 
concerned that terminating the CON program would lead to at least a short-term 
flooding of the market with unneeded services.139 
Although only Wisconsin has reinstated its program after repeal,140 states that 
repealed their CON laws have periodically reconsidered the reasons for repeal. For 
example, a 2006 analysis of the history of California’s CON program and the 
reasons for its repeal concluded that the program suffered from inadequate staffing 
and lack of data, which resulted in the program being significantly less effective 
than if it had been adequately resourced.141 Although the program, initiated in 
1969, had attempted to ensure access to quality healthcare and to contain costs by 
restricting excess hospital capacity, the report concluded that CON was ultimately 
viewed as a failure, an outcome that was heavily influenced not only by the lack of 
resources but also because of a number of exceptions that made the program 
difficult to administer, as well as relative lack of enforcement for noncompliance.142  
Even today, more than forty years after Congress first adopted national 
legislation on certificate of need, the debate remains unsettled, though there 
appears to widespread acknowledgement that CON programs as administered are 
essentially unable to be insulated from political influence. Arguing in 2010 in favor 
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of a more evolved model of state health planning rather than turning the healthcare 
delivery system over to market forces, John Blum acknowledged the marked 
distinction between the intent and reality of CON programs:  
 
Somewhere along the journey of C.O.N. laws, these statutes 
became dominated by process review and evaluation, and the core 
function of creating state and regional health plans dropped from 
the agenda of these agencies, or planning was turned over to state 
bureaucrats whose best efforts were foiled by political realities.143 
 
Indeed, a 2010 retrospective article examining the forty-year history of Rhode 
Island’s CON program, written by a former program director, observed that Rhode 
Island’s recent passage of laws bringing physician-operated ambulatory surgery 
centers and freestanding magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) and computed 
topography (“CT”) scanning machines under the umbrella of CON was driven 
primarily by hospitals seeking to erect barriers to external competition for provision 
of those services rather than a need to restrict competition among providers of 
those services.144 In Pennsylvania, a 2011 analysis revealed that even the sunset of 
the state’s CON laws did not mean the end of the component parts of the program, 
which were quickly reconstituted in different state agencies in response to a desire 
among state policymakers to continue the program.145 Following the sunset of the 
state’s CON laws, the state Department of Health announced its intention to 
strictly construe the quality provisions in its licensing statutes (in addition to 
obtaining a certificate of need to provide the new services, applicants must also 
meet certain quality and other standards to be licensed to provide the services), and 
another state agency developed a new policy under which it would contract only 
with entities that met standards that were essentially the same as those that existed 
under the abolished CON program.146 
Most recently in 2015, current FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen 
characterized certificate of need programs as a “prescription for higher costs.”147 
Ohlhausen observed that CON programs were particularly unhelpful to achieving 
the goals of healthcare market regulation in that they “stand out as an example of 
regulation that squelches the beneficial effects of competition in healthcare markets 
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without delivering valuable public benefits in return.”148 Noting that the cost-plus 
payment methodology that was in existence at the time programs began149 has been 
largely abolished in favor of negotiated rates between insurers and providers, 
Ohlhausen argued that as the “purported market failure that CON laws were 
designed to fix no longer exists,” it should surprise no one that “it has proven 
difficult to demonstrate the benefits of a legislative scheme designed to fix an issue 
overtaken by subsequent events.”150 She further explained that although the benefits 
of CON have been difficult to quantify, the negative results are readily apparent—
CON laws operate to insulate healthcare providers from “socially beneficial” 
competition.151 She correctly raises the question as to why CON laws are still on 
the books in thirty-five states even in the absence of demonstrable success at 
achieving their original cost containment objectives.152 The answer, it seems, is a 
combination of legislative inertia and shifting policy rationales of CON proponents 
to justify the continued existence of the programs. Ohlhausen observes that CON 
laws “insulate politically powerful incumbents from market forces, and those 
providers naturally are loathe to give up the special government preferences that 
CON laws bestow.”153 However, she writes, incumbents cannot directly espouse to 
legislators that they deserve special protection at the expense of the public 
interest—so instead, providers have adopted new rationales for the continued 
existence of CON, among them that the programs allow for improved care of the 
indigent.154 This argument must be deconstructed to be understood, because it is 
not readily apparent how insulation from competition leads to better care for the 
poor. In essence, incumbents argue that the guarantee of restricted competition 
allows them to negotiate higher prices with private insurance companies, thereby 
conferring a larger profit margin, which allows for more resources to provide care to 
poorer patients without insurance.155 So, there is a cross-subsidization whereby 
providers, usually hospitals, will charge higher rates to wealthier patients and retain 
profitable procedures that might otherwise migrate to lower-cost venues (e.g., 
imaging, outpatient surgical procedures) to subsidize unprofitable areas of the 
business, including indigent care.156 The trouble, as Ohlhausen notes, is that this 
argument has not been proven to be correct—studies have not shown a marked 
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difference in the provision of indigent care by hospitals in CON states as compared 
to those in states without the programs.157 
Ohlhausen is careful to distinguish among the circumstances in which CON 
laws offer the most benefit to incumbent healthcare providers. For example, in 
areas with stable or declining populations, CON laws would not normally provide 
much benefit to incumbent providers, as the incentive for new entrants to the 
market is low.158 Conversely, in areas of rapid growth in population or demand for 
healthcare, CON laws restricting entry confer a valuable benefit on incumbents and 
are likely to increase prices, potentially giving providers a material windfall.159 
Moreover, Ohlhausen notes the unintended impact of CON laws on market 
efficiency: in a normal market, new entrants would be incentivized to provide 
services when incumbents either charged excessively high prices or operated at low 
levels of efficiency.160 However, the protection of CON laws effectively benefits the 
weakest providers, who are insulated from the pressures of competition, while 
higher quality providers likely benefit less from CON due to the lower level of 
incentive for new provider entry.161 The degree of benefit is also influenced by a 
number of intertwined variables such as the scope of the CON law (e.g., the 
number of services regulated and the threshold for triggering a CON requirement), 
the degree of enforcement, and the probability of new entry or expansion in the 
absence of a CON law.162 Importantly, Ohlhausen points out, the degree of benefit 
to incumbents operates independently of the expected outcome—that is, how well 
healthcare providers execute their charge to provide indigent care.163 Not only do 
providers reap uneven benefits from CON laws, the degree of benefit appears 
unrelated to both the level of expected indigent care and the quality of that care.164 
Thus, she surmises that the “poor fit” between CON laws and the goal of providing 
indigent care demonstrates that arguments by CON proponents that the programs 
support indigent care claims “appear to be little more than an argument of 
convenience by politically powerful special interests attempting to protect their 
historical government perquisites.”165  
A better approach to indigent care, in Ohlhausen’s view, would be for states to 
fund indigent care costs directly rather than through the hidden costs CON inflicts 
on the insured public and the market as a whole.166 While urging that all states 
repeal their CON laws, she cautions that repeal alone is unlikely to create 
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immediate, dramatic results due to what she believes is the “modest drag on the 
economy” that the laws exert.167 Ultimately, Ohlhausen concludes that government 
regulations such as CON, which undermine the “socially beneficial competitive 
process without returning any offsetting benefits simply cannot be justified.”168  
 
C. Research Casts Serious Doubt on the Effectiveness of  
Certificate of Need Programs 
 
When assessing the evidence with regard to the effectiveness of CON 
programs, it is necessary to examine the research in light of the primary objectives 
of CON laws. The cost containment rationale is the oldest justification for CON 
laws, but it has been supplemented by additional policy objectives, such as 
increasing access to care, particularly for low-income populations, and improving 
quality among healthcare providers. In general, the evidence base for the ability of 
CON programs to achieve any of these objectives is weak, although studies vary in 
design and rigor. 
 
i. CON Programs Do Not Appear to Lead to a  
Reduced Healthcare Cost Trajectory 
 
At first glance, it is not apparent how a supply constraint mechanism can result 
in lower costs for a product. Conventional economic theory suggests that restricting 
supply of a product does not result in reduced prices—rather, assuming constant 
demand, prices would increase in the face of decreased supply as more people 
competed to purchase a product in limited supply. However, healthcare is not a 
normal product and the market for health services has a number of factors that 
render it far from efficient. Thus, the theory for the ability of CON programs to 
contain costs, as noted above, is that by restricting the arms race among healthcare 
providers to build ever newer and more expensive facilities (e.g., new hospital 
buildings when an older one will suffice) and to offer newer and more expensive 
services even when those services are not demonstrably more effective than older 
treatments (e.g., MRI and CT scans instead of X-rays), CON programs prevent 
providers from raising prices to reflect the costs of these newer facilities and 
treatments.169 This theory was reasonable at the time it was first conceived—when 
providers were often paid an amount equal to their cost plus a small percentage of 
that cost, there was no incentive for providers to keep costs low.170 Thus, it stood to 
reason that restricting the ability of providers to increase their costs via capital 
                                                                                                                 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 See Simpson, supra note 11 at 1036–37. 
170 See McGinley, supra note 129 at 184–86. 
2016–2017        Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era 
                              
 
 
227 
expenditures would result in a more reasonable rate of increase in healthcare 
expenditures.  
However, the evidence that CON programs result in lower costs is limited and 
dated, and there exists some research indicating that CON programs may in fact 
lead to higher costs. For example, a 2007 study of 1,957 acute care hospitals (based 
on 1991 data) showed that healthcare costs were, on average, higher in states with 
CON programs.171 Additional studies have come to similar conclusions. A more 
rigorous 2010 study, which controlled for more variables than in prior research 
(e.g., the stringency of a state’s CON program), found no statistically significant 
correlation between the existence of a CON program and cost per hospital 
admission in a state, and a statistically significant positive correlation between the 
stringency of a state’s CON program and the cost per admission.172 In essence the 
authors concluded that CON programs not only failed to correlate to lower costs, 
they might actually lead to higher costs per admission.173 Similarly, evidence 
suggests that when services such as MRI machines and acute care beds are 
regulated, patients tend to pay more for these services.174 While a 2014 study found 
lower hospital cost-inefficiency in CON states than non-CON states, as FTC 
Commissioner Ohlhausen observed, that particular study did not control for the 
possibility that the observed differences could be caused by many other differences 
between states without CON laws, such as market and environmental 
characteristics, factors which were addressed in the 2010 study.175 
In addition, studies appear to contradict fears about a flooding of the market 
with unnecessary services following a repeal of CON laws. For example, a 1998 
study found no evidence of a surge in acquisition of facilities or in costs following 
removal of CON regulations.176 The same study found that mature CON programs 
were not associated with a significant reduction in per capita costs.177 And a 2003 
study showed that states that repealed their CON laws did not experience 
significant growth in either nursing home or long-term care costs.178 When viewed 
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as a whole, this evidence casts considerable doubt on the proposition that CON 
programs lead to reduced healthcare expenditures or that their repeal leads to a 
surge in unnecessary services in the market. 
 
ii. The Evidence That CON Programs Improve Access to Care is Weak 
 
Although some argue that modernizing CON will decrease access to health 
services, evidence does not appear to support this conclusion, at least when using 
supply of services as a proxy for access. Admittedly, supply of services is an 
imprecise metric at best, because the fact that providers are located in a given 
geographic area does not mean that they are willing to provide services to all 
patients—the difficulty that the uninsured and patients with Medicaid have finding 
care, relative to those with private insurance, is well-documented.179 Nonetheless, 
when using supply as a proxy for access, the evidence seems to support the 
conclusion that CON programs restrict access to care. For example, a 2014 study 
by George Mason University showed that while the average state has 362 hospital 
beds per 100,000 population, this number falls to 263 hospital beds per 100,000 
population in states with CON programs.180 In states that regulate acute care beds, 
this number falls to 131 beds per 100,000 population, and this number drops by an 
average of 4.7 beds for each additional service regulated.181 While limited in scope 
and rigor, this evidence suggests that the presence of CON programs reduces the 
capacity of health facilities, and that this effect permeates beyond the regulated 
services. Thus, restrictive CON programs may decrease access to health services. 
Similarly, CON proponents argue that the program’s support increased access to 
care for the indigent, via the cross-subsidization principle described above.182 When 
repeal of CON laws is proposed, CON supporters warn of an influx of for-profit 
providers who will cherry-pick the more lucrative, privately insured patients, 
leaving the nonprofit hospitals with the lower-paying insured patients and the 
uninsured, ultimately leading to a decrease in the provision of care for the 
indigent.183 A recent study, however, found no evidence that CON programs 
increase the amount of indigent care provided in a state.184  
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iii. The Relationship Between CON and Quality of Care is Unclear 
 
Proponents of CON programs argue that such programs improve quality by 
ensuring an adequate volume of patients. And indeed, this argument is based on 
reliable evidence showing that increased volume of patients does lead to improved 
outcomes in hospital settings.185 This is easy to understand—especially when 
considering, for example, that surgeons who repeatedly perform highly complex, 
specialized procedures are likely to be better at those procedures than surgeons who 
perform the same procedure only intermittently.186 Thus, evidence has shown that 
patients experience better outcomes in hospitals with expertise (usually measured as 
higher volume) in particular procedures.187 Importantly, however, this 
demonstrated link between volume and quality appears to be independent of the 
existence of a CON program in a state. Moreover, some evidence suggests that 
stringent CON programs decrease the quality of care in many settings. For 
example, a 1988 study of 1,000 hospitals showed higher mortality rates in hospitals 
in states with stringent CON programs.188 However, a 2002 study assessing risk-
adjusted mortality rates and hospital volumes for Medicare patients undergoing a 
coronary artery bypass graft (“CABG”) in states with and without CON laws found 
higher mortality rates in states without certificate of need regulation.189 In addition, 
the same study found that repeal of certificate of need regulations during the study 
period was associated with declines in hospital volume for CABG surgery.190 A 
2007 study examining whether rates of appropriate cardiac catheterization after 
admission for heart attack varied between states with and without CON regulation 
of cardiac catheterization found that “CON regulation was associated with 
modestly lower rates of equivocally and weakly indicated [(a scientific way of saying 
“potentially unnecessary”)] cardiac catheterization after admission for [heart 
attack], but [found] no significant differences in rates of strongly indicated 
catheterization.”191  
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More recently, a 2009 study found that states that had dropped CON 
regulations had lower mortality rates for CABG surgery than states that kept their 
CON programs.192 The study concluded that this effect may be the result of the 
increased fragmentation of care that results from CON programs.193 Even a simple 
analysis conducted solely for illustrative purposes in this paper examining the 
likelihood of hospital penalization under the Medicare program194 in states with 
and without CON programs shows that hospitals in CON states are approximately 
50% more likely to be penalized than those in non-CON states.195 As Figure 1 
describes, the average percentage of hospitals that were penalized in states with a 
CON program was 57.6% , while the average percentage of hospitals penalized in 
states without a CON program was only 38%, a considerable difference.196 Again, 
this simple analysis does not show that CON programs cause hospitals to be 
penalized; however, the higher rate of penalization in CON states does raise 
questions for further study in view of prior research on the relationship between 
quality of care and CON laws. 
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Overall, the evidence does not support a conclusion that CON programs 
improve the quality of patient care, and there exist significant questions deserving 
of further research regarding the relationship between CON and quality of care. 
 
iv. The Influence of Politics on Certificate of Need Programs 
 
As noted above, stakeholders have consistently identified political influence as a 
barrier to effective administration of CON programs. Indeed, many stakeholders 
believe that the political process has prevented CON programs from achieving 
their objectives, rather than the regulation of the supply of healthcare facilities. For 
example, a 2009 qualitative study conducted by researchers at the Center for 
Studying Health System Change (“HSC”) seemed to confirm the influence of 
politics on the CON process.197 The researchers characterized modern CON 
programs as “an arena where providers often battle for service-line dominance and 
market share,” rather than a neutral process designed to maximize health system 
efficiency.198  
The study included interviews with respondents from six states with CON laws 
(Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, South Carolina, and Washington), and 
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although stakeholder views varied widely about the effectiveness of CON 
regulations on access, quality and costs, there was consensus “[i]n five of the six 
states studied—all except Michigan—the CON approval process can be highly 
subjective and tends to be influenced heavily by political relationships rather than 
policy objectives.”199 In particular, respondents believed factors such as a provider’s 
clout, organizational size, or overall wealth and resources, played more of a role in 
CON decisions than policy objectives.200 Moreover, state CON officials reported 
that although the basic function of their job was to process and review applications, 
they were often “caught in the competitive crossfire between providers during 
appeals, public hearings and legislative battles.”201 Hospitals tended to view the 
process primarily through a competitive lens, using the process to protect existing 
market share, either geographic or by service line, and to block competitors from 
entering their markets.202 However, the researchers noted that hospitals find the 
CON process onerous if they are attempting to enter a market.203 Confirming the 
anticompetitive nature of the process, one hospital respondent said, “[o]nce you 
have the franchise, you are happy to stop others from having it.”204  
While the study respondents were fairly unequivocal about the shortcomings of 
CON programs, most still believed that they were better off with CON in place.205 
One state hospital association respondent noted that while member hospitals 
initially had mixed views about the benefits of CON, they “banded together to 
support the process after realizing it was a valuable tool to block new physician-
owned facilities.”206 Thus, rather than repeal, respondents concluded that CON 
programs should remain in place but would benefit from resource and process 
improvements, including “increased funding for evaluation, improved compliance 
monitoring and movement toward a process driven more by data and planning 
rather than political influence.”207 The authors found that respondents believed 
certain aspects of the Michigan process helped insulate decision making from 
politics, including a division of responsibility between setting CON review 
standards (done by an appointed commission that included many different 
stakeholders) and the actual review of CON applications (conducted by the state 
Department of Community Health).208 
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III. THE ABILITY OF CON PROGRAMS TO SURVIVE  
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
 
It is not for lack of legal challenge that CON programs remain in place. 
Opponents have attempted a number of constitutional and other challenges to the 
laws, but courts have refused to overturn them.  
The most obvious and common line of challenge to CON laws is under the 
Commerce Clause. In Colon Health Centers of America v. Hazel, out-of-state 
providers of medical imaging services challenged Virginia’s CON law under the 
dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause.209 The Fourth Circuit rejected the 
challenge and affirmed the district court, which found that the law neither 
discriminated nor placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.210 The court 
first reiterated the well-known standard that a statute that is facially discriminatory 
or discriminatory in purpose or effect may survive strict scrutiny only if it “advances 
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”211 While the parties agreed the statute was not 
facially discriminatory, plaintiffs argued that it was discriminatory in purpose, with 
a primary goal to shelter existing providers (all of whom were, by definition, in-
state) from competition at the expense of out-of-state businesses seeking entry into 
the market.212 Rejecting this argument, the court noted that Virginia’s CON law 
served a number of “legitimate public purposes: improving healthcare quality by 
discouraging the proliferation of underutilized facilities, enabling underserved and 
indigent populations to access necessary medical services, and encouraging cost-
effective consumer spending.”213 Accordingly, the court said it could not “discern a 
sinister protectionist purpose in this straightforward effort to bring medical care to 
all the citizens of the Commonwealth in the most efficient and professional 
manner.”214  
Turning to the question of whether the law was discriminatory in effect, the 
court was equally unconvinced. Plaintiffs alleged that Virginia’s law “systematically 
advantage[d] established in-state providers at the expense of new, primarily out-of-
state firms,” by impermissibly granting current providers “the authority to thwart 
the market entrance of out-of-state providers” through participation in the 
adversarial process as applications were evaluated (existing providers could oppose 
applications by new entrants at a hearing) and by allowing existing providers to file 
competing applications to block the approval of new entrants.215 The court 
evaluated these claims with regard to whether the plaintiffs demonstrated that 
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Virginia’s CON law, “if enforced, would negatively impact interstate commerce to 
a greater degree than intrastate commerce,” in considering whether the CON law 
“erects a special barrier to market entry by non-domestic entities,”216 but concluded 
that plaintiffs had not shown that they faced a special hardship compared to in-
state providers.217 The court noted repeatedly that CON programs are generally 
policy decisions that are properly the purview of legislators, and although the 
plaintiffs were frustrated by legislative policy, the court declined to take the 
“potentially limitless step of striking down every state regulatory program that has 
some alleged adverse effect on market competition.”218 As the court observed, “[w]e 
live in such an interconnected economy that for any regulation some effects are 
almost bound to be felt out of state. To accept appellants’ arguments ‘would 
broaden the negative Commerce Clause beyond its existing scope.’”219  
Having rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, the court determined that the law 
survived a rational basis review by balancing the putative local benefits against the 
incidental burdens on state commerce, as required by the Supreme Court in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).220 Virginia had put forth a number of 
rational reasons in support of its CON program, among them the many 
justifications described above—improvement in healthcare quality, indigent care, 
ensuring appropriate distribution of services across geographic areas, and even 
healthcare cost reduction.221 Fundamentally, the court believed that the decision 
over the merits of CON was a legislative one, observing that while “[t]he battle 
between laissez fairists and regulators is as old as the hills,” these disputes are “more 
often over economics and politics than over law.”222 Moreover, the court noted, 
“[l]egislators, not jurists, are best able to compare competing economic theories and 
sets of data and then weigh the result against their own political valuations of the 
public interests at stake.”223 
Other circuits have ruled similarly. While there was brief excitement among 
those who oppose CON following the 2011 ruling in Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health (“Yakima I ”), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the dismissal of Sherman Act restraint of trade claims but remanded to the district 
court to consider a dormant Commerce Clause claim, the feeling was short-lived, 
as the district court granted summary judgment on the commerce clause claim and 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2013.224 In Yakima II the plaintiff challenged 
                                                                                                                 
216 Id. (citation omitted). 
217 Id. at 153–54. 
218 Id. at 155. 
219 Id. (quoting United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
220 Id. at 156–57. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 158. 
223 Id.  
224 Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health (“Yakima II”), 731 F.3d 843, 844 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
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regulations related to scheduled, or “elective,” percutaneous coronary interventions 
(“PCIs”), which are nonsurgical procedures used to treat coronary heart disease.225 
Under the Washington state CON law, elective PCIs could be performed only at 
hospitals with a minimum annual volume of 300 procedures.226 Yakima Valley 
Memorial Hospital claimed that the CON requirement lacked a reasonable basis 
and that its putative benefits were outweighed by the burden on interstate 
commerce, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.227 However, similarly to 
the court in Colon Health Centers, the Ninth Circuit had no difficulty finding that 
the regulation survived the Pike balancing test.228 “Accepting as true [Yakima 
Valley] Memorial’s arguments and evidence, the burden on interstate commerce is 
obviously too minor and remote to create a ‘substantial burden’ under Pike.”229 
Moreover, the court found that Washington officials had made a reasonable 
determination in establishing the minimum threshold—acknowledging that courts 
normally would end the inquiry after determining that the burden on interstate 
commerce was insignificant, the Yakima II court nonetheless examined and 
decisively rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the safety benefits derived from the 
threshold established by Washington state were illusory or nonexistent.230  
The only case in which a court has invalidated a CON law under a Commerce 
Clause theory appears to be a 2005 case addressing Puerto Rico’s CON program as 
applied to pharmacies. In Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, the First Circuit found that 
Puerto Rico’s CON program impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state 
pharmacies, based in large part on the fact that Puerto Rico had exempted all of its 
existing pharmacies from the certificate requirements when the law was enacted 
(over 92% of which were locally owned), along with significant disparities in 
treatment of in-state pharmacies and those from out of state. 231 The court 
explained:  
 
While the Secretary has rejected virtually no unopposed 
applications, twenty-three percent of opposed applications have 
been denied. The negative effects on out-of-Commonwealth 
applicants have been particularly pronounced. Over fifty percent 
of out-of-Commonwealth entities have been forced to undergo 
the entire administrative process compared to less than twenty-
                                                                                                                 
225 Id.  
226 Id. at 847. 
227 Id. at 844. 
228 Id. at 847–48. 
229 Id. at 847. 
230 Id. at 848–49. Equal protection claims have fared similarly poorly in court. See Madarang v. 
Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Enforcement of the CON regulations does not violate 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.”). The Madarang court also rejected a 
substantive and procedural due process challenge. Id. 
231 Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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five percent of local applicants. Moreover, of those applicants 
forced to endure the hearing process, the Secretary has granted 
certificates to ninety percent of the local applicants but only to 
fifty-eight percent of out-of-Commonwealth applicants.232  
 
Moreover, the court observed that since the law was enacted in 1979, the 
percentage of locally owned pharmacies had actually increased, from 92% to 94%, 
which the court believed was a strong indicator that the CON law as applied had 
“limited competition in favor of the predominantly local group of existing 
pharmacies.”233 
Several factors caution against extrapolation of the court’s ruling in Rullan to 
other CON laws. First, the court found that the primary—and perhaps only—
justification the state official gave for denying a certificate was that permitting a 
new entrant would “cause undue competition for existing facilities.”234 This is 
distinct from the justifications offered in the Yakima II and Colon Health, where 
states carefully described and documented a litany of policy objectives their CON 
programs were designed to achieve. Indeed, the Yakima II court distinguished 
Rullan on the ground that the Puerto Rico statute in effect protected local 
pharmacies from out-of-state competition, which was unlike the situation in 
Yakima II, where the in-state hospital was seeking to offer the same service that 
was already offered by a provider owned by an out-of-state parent.235 Second, as 
described above, in Rullan there were considerable disparities in the treatment of 
and outcomes for out-of-state applicants.236 The court in Colon Health believed 
this to be a meaningful distinction between the two cases.237 Indeed, it does not 
appear that any CON laws have been invalidated in whole or in part since Rullan. 
A final case worth mentioning involves the 1997 invalidation of Iowa’s CON 
law as applied to abortion facilities. In Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. 
Atchison, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that 
requiring the plaintiff to undergo the CON review process amounted to a 
substantial and unconstitutional burden on the right of access to abortion.238 
Applying Planned Parenthood of So. Pa. v. Casey,239 the court recognized that 
CON laws serve legitimate purposes and are constitutional if they impose only the 
“incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an 
abortion” and do not “otherwise impose an undue burden on one’s ability to obtain 
                                                                                                                 
232 Id. at 56 (internal footnotes omitted). 
233 Id. 
234 Id.  
235 Yakima II, 731 F.3d at 848. 
236 Rullan, 405 F.3d 50 at 55. 
237 Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 813 F.3d 145, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2016). 
238 Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1997). 
239 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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an abortion.”240 However, the court found that state officials subjected plaintiffs to 
the CON requirement solely because they intended to provide abortion services, 
and that similarly situated facilities that did not provide abortion services had 
consistently been exempted from the CON requirement.241 As with Rullan, the 
highly specific circumstances of this case caution against attempts to generalize to 
other challenges to CON laws. 
Thus, it appears that CON programs are firmly established in the thirty-five 
states where they have not been repealed, and will be upheld by courts in the 
absence of blatantly protectionist measures. Those inclined to reform CON will 
have to undertake these efforts via the legislative and regulatory process, as courts 
have steadfastly refused to interject themselves into policy decisions with regard to 
the structure of state healthcare delivery systems. 
 
IV. CERTIFICATE OF NEED IN THE POST-AFFORDABLE CARE ERA:  
A CASE STUDY FROM KENTUCKY 
 
A. The Changing Healthcare Landscape:  
The Affordable Care Act and Value-Based Payment 
 
The United States’ healthcare system has changed tremendously in the past 
decade, driven by a number of factors, the most significant of which are the ACA 
and the related move toward so-called “value-based payment.”242 On March 23, 
2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law.243 The ACA was intended to 
provide all persons in the United States with guaranteed access to affordable 
healthcare by fixing the “patchwork” United States system, filling in gaps in the 
existing framework by: eliminating the ability of insurance companies to 
discriminate based on pre-existing conditions and strictly limiting pricing based on 
age; requiring individuals who lack access to an affordable employer-based 
insurance option to purchase private insurance (with subsidies for individuals from 
100 to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”); and expanding eligibility for 
Medicaid to include all adults with income less than 138% of the FPL.244  
                                                                                                                 
240 Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048, 1049. 
241 Id. at 1046. 
242 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of Title 26 and 42 of the U.S.C.); see also MELINDA 
ABRAMS, ET AL., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S PAYMENT AND DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORMS: A 
PROGRESS REPORT AT FIVE YEARS, COMMONWEALTH FUND 10 (May 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-
brief/2015/may/1816_abrams_aca_reforms_delivery_payment_rb.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP4H-UFTH]. 
243 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of Title 26 and 42 of the U.S.C.). 
244 Id.  
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If the ACA was fully implemented, the overwhelming majority of United States 
residents245 would be able to access affordable healthcare, with thirty-two million 
people projected to acquire insurance after implementation at the time the law was 
passed.246 The ACA has been tremendously controversial and the subject of 
multiple lawsuits, including National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law’s 
individual mandate provision but ruled that states had the option whether to 
expand their Medicaid programs to cover individuals below 138% of the FPL.247 
Although states have varied significantly in their implementation of the ACA,248 
the United States has seen a material expansion of insurance coverage since the 
law’s primary coverage provisions came into effect in 2014, with an estimated 20 
million individuals obtaining insurance coverage.249  
Thus, the healthcare landscape has altered significantly—for example, in 
Kentucky, the rate of uncompensated care provided by hospitals has dropped 
sharply since the ACA, reflecting that many individuals who were formerly 
uninsured are now covered by Medicaid or private insurance plans.250 These 
changes have implications for CON programs. In particular, one of the historic 
justifications for continuation of CON programs has been, in essence, that 
providers, especially safety-net hospitals, require protection from competition in 
order to maintain sufficiently profitable services (from privately insured patients) to 
subsidize the uncompensated care that they provide to the indigent.251 This 
rationale is materially less persuasive when the poor are now insured via Medicaid, 
                                                                                                                 
245 Under the Affordable Care Act, undocumented residents are neither eligible for the Medicaid 
expansion nor federal subsidies to purchase insurance via the exchanges established under the Affordable 
Care Act. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(3) (2016) (stating that the mandate does not apply to undocumented 
immigrants); Affordable Care Act § 1312(f)(3) (banning undocumented immigrants from purchasing 
insurance via exchanges). In addition, the law bans undocumented residents from purchasing insurance 
on the exchanges solely at their own expense. Id. 
246 Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN4J-PEF2]. 
247 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580, 2608 (2012). 
248 The drop in uninsured rates has varied significantly across the states. See Barack Obama, United 
States Healthcare Reform: Progress to Date and Next Steps, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 525, 527, 530 
(2016), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2533698 [https://perma.cc/7GVS-ES37]. 
For example, thirty two states and the District of Columbia have chosen to expand their Medicaid 
programs; the remaining states have not. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-
medicaid-expansion-decision/ [https://perma.cc/YJH3-5J46].  
249 Obama, supra note 248, at 527. 
250 See Study of the Impact of the ACA Implementation in Kentucky, Quarterly Snapshot: January 
- March 2015, FOUND. FOR A HEALTHY KY., https://www.healthy-
ky.org/res/images/resources/SHADAC_ACA-Impact-Study_Quarterly-Snapshot-Q12015_0-1-.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2MJ6-P33A] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
251 See Ohlhausen, supra note 3, at 50, 52.  
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which allows hospitals and other providers to be reimbursed for the services they 
provide. 
Similarly, the federal government has led a movement away from “fee for 
service” (“FFS”) reimbursement, in which healthcare providers are reimbursed for 
specific services they provide without reference to the quality of those services, 
whether the service was truly necessary, or the patient outcome as a result of the 
service. Recognizing that the FFS system created economically undesirable 
incentives for healthcare providers and failed to reward higher quality providers for 
delivering efficient care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
has undertaken a robust effort to reform the way in which the Medicare program 
pays for healthcare services. CMS has several value-based payment programs, some 
optional and others mandatory, and this Article will not describe them in detail.252 
For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to observe that under these value-based 
payment programs, healthcare providers who treat Medicare patients (which is 
most healthcare providers in the United States)253 either currently or will soon 
receive at least a portion of their payment under a payment system that 
incorporates measures of the value of the care delivered. Before the ACA, almost 
no Medicare payments were made under value-based payment models. However, 
the payment landscape has changed dramatically in the past several years. For 
example, since 2012, CMS has penalized hospitals a portion of their Medicare 
reimbursements if they fail to meet quality standards with regard to the rate of 
readmission following certain procedures.254  
The Obama Administration has established aggressive goals to increase the 
percentage of Medicare payments that are made under value-based structures; the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which oversees CMS, has 
set a goal of tying 30% of FFS Medicare payments to quality or value through 
alternative payment models by the end of 2016,255 and tying 50% of payments to 
                                                                                                                 
252 Interested readers should visit the CMS website to learn more about value-based payment. See 
What Are Value-Based Programs?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-Based-
Programs/Value-Based-Programs.html [https://perma.cc/E4NE-4FZX] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
253 See Cristinia Boccuti, et. al., Medicare Patients’ Access to Physicians: A Synthesis of Evidence, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-patients-access-
to-physicians-a-synthesis-of-the-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/7V4R-GY99] (finding that 91% of non-
pediatric physicians reported accepting new Medicare patients). 
254 See CMS Final Rule to Improve Quality of Care During Hospital Inpatient Stays, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 2, 2013), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/mediareleasedatabase/fact-sheets/2013-fact-sheets-items/2013-08-02-
3.html [https://perma.cc/FYK5-LJS3]. 
255 Press Release, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Reaches Goal of Tying 30 Percent of 
Medicare Payments to Quality Ahead of Schedule (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/03/03/hhs-reaches-goal-tying-30-percent-medicare-payments-
quality-ahead-schedule.html [https://perma.cc/UM34-YMAE]. 
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these models by the end of 2018.256 In addition, HHS also established a “goal of 
tying 85 percent of all traditional Medicare payments to quality or value by 2016 
and 90 percent by 2018 through programs such as the Hospital Value Based 
Purchasing and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Programs.”257 Given that 
Medicare comprises a large share of the healthcare expenditures in the United 
States (approximately 20% in 2014),258 the flow-through effects on the business 
models of healthcare providers can be expected to be significant as private insurers 
and eventually state Medicaid plans follow suit.259  
In short, the post-ACA healthcare market looks very different. This is true 
whether a state has embraced healthcare reform or resisted it. Accordingly, the 
historic rationale for CON programs, much of which rested on a foundation of (1) 
a large uninsured population requiring significant uncompensated care from 
providers and (2) a market in which providers were reimbursed under a FFS 
payment structure, must now be reexamined in view of the shifted coverage and 
payment landscape. Policy objectives such as cost containment via supply 
restrictions (on the theory that a bed built is a bed filled) and preventing 
overutilization of high-cost services are significantly less relevant when payment is 
based on the value of the service delivered rather than the quantity of services 
provided. Similarly, enabling cross-subsidization of profitable services to support 
the provision of indigent care becomes less necessary when the uninsured 
population is significantly reduced. 
 
B. Case Study: Modernization of the CON Program in Kentucky 
 
In Kentucky, as in the thirty-five other states that retain CON programs, there 
                                                                                                                 
256 Press Release, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Better, Smarter, Healthier: In Historic 
Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for Shifting Medicare Reimbursements from 
Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/01/26/better-smarter-
healthier-in-historic-announcement-hhs-sets-clear-goals-and-timeline-for-shifting-medicare-
reimbursements-from-volume-to-value.html [https://perma.cc/SQ87-9EHC]. 
257 Id. For more detail on these programs, see generally Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 18, 2016, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-Reduction-Program.html [https://perma.cc/92HN-3F2V]; 
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 30, 2015, 2:33 
PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/hospital-
value-based-purchasing/index.html [https://perma.cc/P6LF-F86S]. 
258 NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 10, 2016, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/DT44-G5ZH]. 
259 Indeed, some state Medicaid plans are already adopting value-based payment models in their 
programs. See The State Innovation Models (SIM) Program: A Look at Round 2 Grantees, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/the-state-innovation-models-sim-
program-a-look-at-round-2-grantees/ [https://perma.cc/QH37-FURQ]. 
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has been no political will for repeal of the CON laws among either party.260 There 
was widespread acknowledgement among policymakers and stakeholders, however, 
that the CON program was ripe for modernization in view of the changing 
coverage and payment landscapes.261 Accordingly, the administration of Governor 
Steven L. Beshear undertook a thorough examination of Kentucky’s CON program 
to identify ways to evolve the program to meet the needs of the post-ACA 
environment.262 
 
i. Kentucky’s Certificate of Need Program Prior to the Affordable Care Act 
 
Kentucky first enacted CON laws in 1972.263 Since that time, the program has 
undergone minor revisions, such as a 2012 amendment that exempted certain long-
term care facilities from the certificate of need process.264 Today, Kentucky requires 
most types of healthcare providers to obtain a certificate of need before providing 
health services. These services include the following:265 
 
 Acute hospital beds  Ambulatory surgical centers 
 Comprehensive rehabilitation  Chemical dependency centers 
 Inpatient psychiatric facilities  Private duty nursing 
 Residential psychiatric facilities  Neonatal care centers 
 Nursing facilities  Open heart programs 
 Home health agencies  Transplant programs 
 Hospice services  Magnetic resonance imaging 
 Residential hospice services  Positron emission tomography 
 Cardiac catheterization services  Megavoltage radiation equipment 
 
                                                                                                                 
260 See DELOITTE, THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY HEALTHCARE FACILITY CAPACITY 
REPORT 52 (2013), 
http://healthbenefitexchange.ky.gov/Documents/KY_Health_Care_Facility_Capacity_Report_2013_%
5B2%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9CH-THW9 ] [hereinafter KENTUCKY HEALTHCARE FACILITY 
CAPACITY REPORT]. 
261 Special Memorandum from the Ky. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. Office of Health 
Policy, Certificate of Need Modernization: Core Principles Request for Stakeholder Input (Oct. 8, 
2014), http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/A8B19E4D-2B97-44C1-A461-
9E8D3BEACD94/0/SpecialMemorandumCONModernization.doc [https://perma.cc/6BVT-HEJN] 
[hereinafter Special Memorandum from Ky. Cabinet]. 
262 See, e.g., KENTUCKY HEALTHCARE FACILITY CAPACITY REPORT, supra note 260, at 7–10. 
263 Christopher Koopman, et al., Certificate-of-Need Laws: Implications for Kentucky, 
MERCATUS CTR. (May 26, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/certificate-need-laws-
implications-kentucky [https://perma.cc/P7W2-XX4Z]. 
264 See H.B. 388, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2012). 
265 DELOITTE, supra note 260, at 7. 
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The process by which a potential provider can obtain a CON in Kentucky is 
governed by both statute266 and regulation.267 The Cabinet for Health and Family 
Services is empowered, under KRS § 216B.040(3)(e) and the pursuant regulations, 
to create a procedure to review CON applications.268 The Cabinet must review 
applications that require formal review within ninety days of issuing a public notice 
regarding a hearing.269 The ninety-day review period follows the date of public 
notice, which gives interested parties notice that an application is being reviewed.270 
Applications are reviewed in batches, with applications for similar services being 
reviewed together.271 Hearings are conducted by administrative law judges, who 
enter a final decision on behalf of the Cabinet.272 Decisions of the administrative 
law judges may be reviewed by state circuit courts.273A hearing may or may not be 
requested by affected parties after the public notice.274 At a hearing, affected 
parties—including, but not limited to, the original applicant—may participate.275 
Whether a party is “affected” has been the subject of litigation. For example, a 
Kentucky court found that a hospital lacked standing to challenge the application 
of a birthing center, because the services provided for childbearing at the hospital 
were materially different than those at a birthing center.276 But, affected parties 
often include other health service providers in the area.277 
When formally reviewing CON applications, the Cabinet looks to ensure that 
applications meet criteria described in section 216B.040(2)(a) of the Kentucky 
Revised Statutes and title 900, section 6:065 of the Kentucky Administrative 
Regulations. These criteria place the burden on an applicant to produce evidence of 
five criteria,278 described in Figure 2, below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
266 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.010-990 (West 2016). 
267 See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020, 6:020–6:130 (2016). 
268 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(3)(e) (West 2016). 
269 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:065, 6:090 (2016). 
270 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:065 (2016). 
271 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.062 (West 2016). 
272 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:090 (2016). 
273 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.115(1) (West 2016). 
274 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.085 (West 2016). 
275 Id. 
276 Visitation Birth & Family Wellness Ctr., Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., No. 13-
CI-01013 (Ky. Cir. Feb. 23, 2015), http://birthmonopoly.com/bmp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Circuit-Court-Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5S-9GL4]. 
277 Id. 
278 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(2)(a) (West 2016). 
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Figure 2. Summary of Certificate of Need Requirements in Kentucky279 
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ii. The Need for Modernization of the CON Program 
 
As described in Section IV.A. above, the healthcare environment in the United 
States has undergone enormous changes in the past decade, particularly since 
enactment of the ACA.280 In Kentucky, it was apparent that one of the most 
important changes likely to result from the implementation of the ACA was an 
                                                                                                                 
279 This figure was constructed with data from KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(2)(a) (West 
2016). 
280 See supra Section IV.A. 
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increase in the number of individuals accessing health services over ensuing years, 
particularly immediately following the expansion of insurance coverage to more 
Kentucky residents.281 As part of its ACA implementation effort, Kentucky 
contracted with an independent consulting firm to conduct a thorough review of 
Kentucky’s healthcare facility capacity to determine whether Kentucky had in place 
the healthcare infrastructure to meet the current and anticipated future need for 
services for its residents (the “Facility Capacity Study”).282  
The Facility Capacity Study had several important findings. Among them, 
projections of changes in healthcare utilization rates as a majority of the 640,000 
uninsured Kentuckians (prior to January 1, 2014, when the ACA’s insurance 
coverage provisions became effective), gained coverage either through Medicaid 
expansion or private health insurance in the years following ACA 
implementation.283 The study concluded that the shift in coverage would result in a 
shift in utilization, with the use of inpatient services increasing by 6% and the use 
of outpatient services increasing by 3% by 2017.284 The study identified several 
shortcomings in Kentucky’s existing delivery system. In particular, the study 
documented excess capacity in acute care settings (inpatient hospital beds), 
projecting a decline of as much as 5% in the demand for inpatient acute care by 
2017, even after accounting for impacts of population growth and coverage 
expansion due to the ACA.285 The study also observed that the national use rate for 
outpatient surgery was 56% higher than the Kentucky rate; similarly, ambulatory 
surgical facilities in the Commonwealth were experiencing high utilization.286 The 
study also projected a need for additional home health capacity in order to meet a 
projected 14% increase in demand for home health services.287 Finally, the study 
found a need for more home and community based services to support the 
transition of patient care from facilities to the community.288 
Unsurprisingly, the study concluded that the Commonwealth’s CON program 
has slowed health facility expansion, and identified ambulatory surgical centers as a 
particular example of this artificially slowed growth.289 Of the forty-three 
applications for ambulatory surgical center CONs since 2003, two were approved, 
eighteen were denied, revoked, deferred or withdrawn, and twenty-three were 
approved under a nonsubstantive review process, an expedited process that applies 
only in limited circumstances.290 The ASC applicants approved under the 
                                                                                                                 
281 DELOITTE, supra note 260, at 11. 
282 Id. at 7. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 18–19. 
285 Id. at 27. 
286 Id. at 45–46. 
287 Id. at 71. 
288 Id. at 77–78. 
289 Id. at 58. 
290 Id. at 109; see also 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:075 (2016) (providing for nonsubstantive review); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.015(18) (West 2016) (defining “nonsubstantive review”). 
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nonsubstantive review process consisted largely of applications from facilities with 
existing CONs who sought to make minor changes to their facilities, such as 
location and cost escalations on existing projects.291 Thus, the evidence in the 
report suggested that of the twenty new providers seeking to enter the health 
market, 90% were denied entry.292 
The Facility Capacity Study contained a number of recommendations, several 
of which related to the Kentucky CON program. Given a documented need for 
additional home health services, the study recommended that the Commonwealth 
consider the discontinuation of the requirement that home health agencies obtain a 
CON.293 The study documented excess capacity and market distortion resulting 
from partial regulation of MRIs (only certain MRI providers were required to 
obtain CON approval; others who already possessed a CON for MRIs could add 
another MRI machine without obtaining a CON); accordingly, the study 
recommended that the Commonwealth consider discontinuing the CON program 
for certain types of imaging, including MRIs.294 In view of the shortage of 
ambulatory surgery capacity described above, the study also recommended possible 
suspension, discontinuation, or relaxation of the CON program in relation to 
ambulatory surgery centers.295 
 
iii. The Modernization Process in Kentucky 
 
Rather than simply accepting the recommendations of the Facility Capacity 
Study, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services undertook a year-long process 
of stakeholder input and revision to the existing State Health Plan, which outlines 
                                                                                                                 
291 DELOITTE, supra note 260, at 109. 
292 See id. 
293 Id. at 86. 
294 Id. at 98–105. 
295 Id. at 110. 
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the numerical need criteria by which applications are assessed.296 On October 8, 
2014, the Cabinet announced its intention to critically review Kentucky’s CON 
program.297 As a first step, the Cabinet identified seven guiding principles for the 
modernization process, described in Figure 3 below, with an overarching vision of 
identifying reforms that would enable Kentucky to develop a health system that 
could achieve the so-called “Triple Aim: better value, better care, and population 
health improvement.”298 Stakeholders were invited to submit comments in writing 
or at either of two listening sessions held by Cabinet officials, and the Cabinet 
requested that proposals specifically identify how they would further one or more of 
the goals outlined in the guiding principles.299 
 
Figure 3. Summary of Guiding Principles of Kentucky CON Modernization300 
 
 Supporting the Evolution of Care Delivery. The trend is decisively away 
from a high-overhead acute/inpatient model to an outpatient-centric model. 
Thus, the CON program will seek to give healthcare facilities the ability to 
respond to market trends in a timely fashion, enabling the continued service 
                                                                                                                 
296 In a particularly unusual twist, Kentucky’s CON program is currently structured to consider the 
question of the need for a particular service twice. Section 216B.040(2)(a) of the Kentucky Revised 
Statutes requires the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to establish criteria for the issuance and 
denial of certificates of need and limits review to certain considerations. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
216B.040(2)(a) (West 2016). The first consideration is “Consistency with plans” which requires that 
“[e]ach proposal approved by the Cabinet shall be consistent with the State Health Plan, and shall be 
subject to biennial budget authorizations and limitations, and with consideration given to the proposal's 
impact on healthcare costs in the Commonwealth.” Id. Thus, all applications are first evaluated for 
consistency with the State Health Plan, which contains formulas and other criteria to determine 
whether there is a documented need for a particular service. Id. However, there is also a separate and 
additional review criterion called “need and accessibility,” which requires proposals to “meet an 
identified need in a defined geographic area and be accessible to all residents of the area.” Id. Critics of 
the CON program documented many instances in which the State Health Plan formula showed that a 
service was needed, yet existing providers opposed an application on the ground that they could meet 
the existing need without introduction of a new provider into the market. See, e.g., Public Hearing on 
900 KAR 5:020 and 900 KAR 1:055 Before the Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health and 
Family Servs. 20 (June 22, 2015, 9:00 AM) (statement of Brian Lebanion, Professional Home 
Healthcare Agency, Inc. & Friends and Companions Adult Day Care Health). Applications were 
routinely denied on this ground (failure to prove need and accessibility), yet there exists no enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that the additional need will in fact be met by existing providers. Id. For that 
reason, the state considered issuing a new regulation pursuant to which providers who demonstrated 
consistency with the State Health Plan would receive a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the 
“need and accessibility” criteria; however, this regulation was withdrawn prior to the end of the Beshear 
administration. See 900 KY. ADMIN REGS. 6:070 (filed Aug. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM) (amended after 
comments), http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/8ED9C4F8-5241-41F2-AE93-
918BE794C934/0/900KAR6070AmendedafterCommentsCONconsiderationsforformalreview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VKJ-ZC6T]. 
297 Special Memorandum from Ky. Cabinet, supra note 261. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
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of local communities in a changing healthcare environment. 
  Incentivizing Development of a Full Continuum of Care. Better care, 
increased value and improved population health depend on an integrated 
continuum of care in which providers communicate with each other and 
ensure that patients receive timely, coordinated care in an appropriate 
setting. Payment structures are evolving to reflect these goals; therefore, the 
CON program will work to promote and support providers and facilities 
that seek to develop a robust continuum of care alone or in partnership with 
others. 
  Incentivizing Quality. Healthcare is rapidly moving toward adoption of 
objective quality metrics. Thus, the CON program will seek to support those 
providers that demonstrate attainment of robust quality indicators. 
  Improving Access to Care. For a number of reasons, Medicaid members 
have, on average, a more challenging path toward access to care. Thus, the 
CON program will seek to incorporate strategies that will incentivize greater 
access to care for Medicaid members, the newly insured and the remaining 
uninsured. 
  Improving Value of Care. As healthcare transitions from a fee-for-service 
model to a value-based purchasing framework, payers will continue to seek 
evidence of value in health services. Thus, the CON program will seek to 
incentivize both price transparency and demonstrable value from health 
professionals and facilities. 
  Promoting Adoption of Efficient Technology. Increased adoption of 
technologies such as electronic medical records, participation in information 
sharing platforms such as the Kentucky Health Information Exchange, and 
participation in large-scale data projects such as an All Payer Claims 
Database are critical elements of a modernized, higher quality and more 
efficient health system. Thus, the CON program will seek to incentivize 
adoption of technologies deemed to further improve value in Kentucky’s 
health system. 
 Exempting Services for which CON is no longer necessary. Kentucky 
regulates via CON many services that even CON states exempt. Thus, 
Office of Health Policy will seek to focus on strategies to modernize 
Kentucky’s CON program to be more reflective of modern healthcare 
trends. 
 
iv. Stakeholder Input on CON Modernization 
 
More than fifty individuals and organizations attended the listening sessions, 
and written comments were submitted by nearly sixty discrete entities representing 
hundreds of stakeholders, including large statewide organizations such as the 
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Kentucky Hospital Association, the Kentucky Primary Care Association, the 
Kentucky Association of Healthcare Facilities, and many others.301 Key themes 
from the comments are consistent with those that have been identified in other 
states: allowing for provision of indigent care, supporting higher quality services via 
the prevention of excess market dilution, promotion of market stability, and 
helping to contain costs. Key themes from select stakeholder groups are 
summarized below.302 
 
 Comments from Hospitals: Comments from hospitals and hospital 
associations tended to be supportive of the current CON program and 
opposed to significant changes. These comments focused on the stability 
provided by the CON program and questioned whether CON 
modernization was necessary to achieve healthcare innovation. Yet several 
comments suggested piecemeal policy changes to improve the CON 
program, such as exempting diagnostic modalities like MRIs from CON 
requirements. Other suggested policy changes included providing 
preferential treatment for CON applicants who will serve a designated 
number of Medicaid patients and requiring health facilities to disclose 
information about proposed prices in the CON application process in an 
effort to promote price transparency and competition.  
 Comments from Community–Based Service Providers: Home and 
community–based health providers were split on the necessity of 
continuing the CON program for these services. While some commented 
on the importance of maintaining the program, others noted that CON 
should be limited to high–risk projects with a large capital investment, a 
category that does not include services such as home health. Many long–
term care providers expressed the belief that it is important to continue to 
regulate long–term care via CON. These providers made several 
suggestions about how to modify the CON program to achieve the 
Cabinet’s goals, including exemptions to allow providers to shift beds from 
low–utilization service areas to high–utilization service areas without 
submitting an additional application.  
 Comments from Other Stakeholders: Other stakeholders–including 
professional organizations, industry groups, and charitable foundations–
offered a variety of comments regarding the CON modernization process. 
Many of these comments suggested exempting certain services, such as 
birth centers and home health services, from the CON application 
                                                                                                                 
301 See generally CON Modernization, KY. CABINET FOR HEALTH & FAM. SERVS., 
http://www.chfs.ky.gov/ohp/con/conmod.htm [https://perma.cc/5V6B-DNVN] (last updated July 14, 
2015) (containing links to the written comments received and links to videos of the listening sessions). 
302 For full stakeholder online comments, see CON Modernizations Comments, KY. CABINET FOR 
HEALTH & FAM. SERVS., http://www.chfs.ky.gov/ohp/con/conres.htm [https://perma.cc/6K8L-
XZA4] (last updated Mar. 30, 2015). 
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process. These comments also emphasized the importance that the 
Cabinet proceed cautiously with CON modernization so as to ensure that 
all changes reflect existing evidence and current patient need.  
 
v. The Reforms to the CON Program 
 
In May 2015, the Cabinet proposed several reforms to the CON process via a 
revised State Health Plan, which became effective in October 2016. These reforms 
can broadly be lumped into three categories: use of uniform review criteria to 
promote increased use of electronic medical records and health information 
exchanges; exemption of certain services from the State Health Plan; and 
preferential treatment for providers who meet certain objective quality metrics or 
participate in value-based payment programs.303 
 
a. Uniform Review: Criteria for All Applications 
 
The revised State Health Plan includes a requirement for all applicants for a 
certificate of need to meet several criteria:  
 
 All new applicants are required to demonstrate a plan for indigent and 
medically underserved patients in the proposed service area; 
 All applicants who propose to expand existing services (or add beds) are 
required to document not only the existence of a signed participation 
agreement with the Kentucky Health Information Exchange (KHIE),304 but 
also active participation in the exchange via submission of summary of care 
records and accessing of data and information from KHIE for care 
coordination if the existing service has an electronic health record; and  
 All new providers must document the existence of a signed participation 
agreement with KHIE and submit summary of care records as well as access 
data and information from KHIE for care coordination within twelve (12) 
months of licensure.305  
 
                                                                                                                 
303 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 (2015), amended by 900 KY. ADMIN. REG. 5:020E (2016). 
304 The Kentucky Health Information Exchange is a “common, secure electronic information 
infrastructure,” which “meets national standards to ensure interoperability across various health systems 
and connectivity to the National Health Information Network,” thereby affording healthcare providers 
“the functionality to support preventive health and disease management through alerts, messaging and 
other tools.” About KHIE, KY. HEALTH INFO. EXCHANGE, http://khie.ky.gov/Pages/aboutkhie.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/K3WQ-42AH] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
305 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 §§ I.C., III.A., III.B., V.B. (2015), amended by 900 KY. ADMIN. 
REGS. 5:020E (2016).  
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Together, these provisions require providers to undertake meaningful participation 
in KHIE, with the ultimate objective of increasing care coordination of patients.306 
For example, if a patient arrives at a hospital, the hospital should be able to access 
the patient’s medical records from other providers via KHIE, which should in 
theory prevent medical errors and improve the ability of providers to provide 
seamless, coordinated care.307 Moreover, these new criteria require all new providers 
to use electronic medical records, as participation in KHIE is not possible without 
them.308 Admittedly, healthcare providers already had considerable incentives to 
increase their use of electronic medical records through the federal government’s 
“Meaningful Use” initiative;309 however, the requirement under the revised State 
Health Plan to use KHIE to both share and obtain patient records builds upon the 
existing federal incentive by adding a more prescriptive element to the regulatory 
landscape.310 In addition, the uniform review criteria maintain the preexisting 
requirement for applicants to document a plan of care for the uninsured and 
medically underserved.311 
 
b. Removal of Certain Services from the State Health Plan 
 
The revised State Health Plan removes two service categories from review: 
adult day health programs and outpatient healthcare centers.312 The original 
proposal by the Cabinet contemplated removing several other components from the 
State Health Plan (ambulance services, chemical dependency treatment beds, and 
MRI); however, in response to feedback from stakeholders, those proposals were 
retracted (ambulance services and chemical dependency treatment beds) or 
modified (MRI; see below).313 It is important to note, however, that the 
                                                                                                                 
306 See id.  
307 See id. 
308 See id. 
309 See generally Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives 
[https://perma.cc/G7XE-APMX] (last updated Feb. 6, 2015); EHR Incentive Programs, 
HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-incentive-programs 
[https://perma.cc/NCV8-X6BL] (last updated Jan. 15, 2013). 
310 See 900 KY. ADMIN. REG. 5:020 at iv (2016). 
311 See id.  
312 See generally id. Under the prior State Health Plan, an “Outpatient Healthcare Center” was 
defined as “a public or private provider-based institution with permanent facilities on a single campus, 
that is under the supervision of an organized medical staff and that is comprised of components for the 
provision of primary care, ambulatory surgery, twenty–four (24) hour emergency care, and radiologic 
and magnetic resonance imaging.” KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 57 (2013). At the time of the most 
recent revision to the State Health Plan, there was only one “Outpatient Healthcare Center” in the 
Commonwealth. KY. CABINET FOR HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., HEALTHCARE FACILITY 
DIRECTORIES, MISCELLANEOUS DIRECTORIES at 22 (Sept. 2016), 
chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/B18B4766-D692-4054-AF53-
D149D028868B/0/MiscellaneousDirectoryOctober2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWL4-RBXK]. 
313 See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 49–51, 57, 61. 
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consequence of removal from the State Health Plan is not full exemption from the 
CON process.314 Under Kentucky law, full exemption can be accomplished only by 
legislation.315 Rather, removal moves the service category into a different, more 
streamlined form of CON review called “nonsubstantive review,” pursuant to which 
applications are reviewed monthly rather than batched semi-annually, and where 
approval is more likely.316 
 
c. Consistency With the State Health Plan for Providers Who Meet  
Objective Quality Metrics or Participate in Value-Based Payment Programs 
 
Most significantly, the revised State Health Plan creates new review criteria 
that effectively preference providers who meet objective quality metrics or 
participate in value-based payment programs.317 Under prior State Health Plans, 
providers normally had to demonstrate consistency with the plan by showing need 
for a particular service under a numeric formula contained in the plan for most 
health services.318 For example, under the prior plan, consistency with the State 
Health Plan for home health services had been determined pursuant to a numeric 
formula that required applicants who wished to open a new home health agency to 
demonstrate a need for at least 250 additional patients as shown in calculations 
conducted by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, or 125 additional 
patients in the case of existing agencies who wished to expand operations into a 
new service area.319 In essence, if the Cabinet’s numerical calculations did not show 
a need for a sufficient number of new patients, applications could not be approved 
because it would not be possible to show consistency with the State Health Plan.  
Under the new State Health Plan, existing home health agencies who achieve 
specific quality ratings under rating systems established by CMS need not meet the 
numeric formula for need describe above; rather, those agencies are deemed 
consistent with the state health plan solely by virtue of attaining quality 
standards.320 Similarly, a hospital that meets certain CMS quality thresholds can be 
deemed consistent with the plan in recognition of input from hospitals that 
establishing hospital-owned home health agencies would better allow them to 
follow patients after discharge, ultimately improving quality and continuity of 
care.321 In addition, the updated State Health Plan adds a provision deeming 
                                                                                                                 
314 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.061 (West 2016) (requiring a certificate of need for most new 
health services and many expansions of existing services). 
315 Id. 
316 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.095 (West 2016).  
317 See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 (2016). 
318 See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 (2013). 
319 Id. at 32–33. 
320 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E at 36–37 (2016). 
321 Id. at 36; see also KY. HOSP. ASS’N, STATE HEALTH PLAN COMMENTS (June 24, 2015), 
chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/C78FBA9E-7DC3-4185-9EAD-
D4CF9D2579A3/0/CommentsfromHospitals.pdf [https://perma.cc/443K-TCQR]. 
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certain providers consistent with the plan if they participate in federal value-based 
payment programs.322 
In the case of ambulatory surgery centers, the most hotly contested area in the 
CON program,323 the updated State Health Plan added a provision allowing 
hospitals that meet certain quality thresholds under CMS rankings to be deemed 
consistent with the plan.324 In so doing, the plan attempts to provide a mechanism 
for an increase in outpatient facilities, as recommended by the Facility Capacity 
Study, while still being responsive to concerns of stakeholders about possible 
market destabilization in the event of a flood in outpatient providers. Similarly, 
nursing home providers have more flexibility under the revised plan. Under the 
prior plan, it was exceptionally difficult for new beds to be approved, and there was 
no ready mechanism for transfer of beds among providers. The revised plan 
attempts to address that concern through the addition of a specific provision 
enabling the transfer of nursing home beds, but only among providers who meet 
specific CMS quality thresholds.325  
Significantly, the revised plan attempts to facilitate the provision of high quality 
cancer treatment in additional geographic areas of the Commonwealth, an issue of 
particular importance given Kentucky’s historically high cancer rates.326 Under the 
prior plan, applicants for megavoltage radiation services had to satisfy a formula 
                                                                                                                 
322 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 37 (2015), amended by 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016) 
(“[A]n application to home health services shall be consistent with this Plan if the application is 
submitted by: (a) An entity or entities that comprise a Kentucky-based federally qualified Accountable 
Care Organization (“ACO”) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program or the Next Generation 
ACO Model . . . or (b) A licensed Kentucky home health agency which shares common management 
and control with an entity that provides substantial health management services to a physician-led 
Kentucky-based federally qualified Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”) under the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program or the Next Generation ACO Model, to provide home health services within 
counties in which attributed patients of such physician-led ACO reside . . . .”). 
323 In an attempt to ensure that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services did not remove the 
Ambulatory Surgical Center criteria from the State Health Plan, the Kentucky General Assembly 
enacted the following as part of the 2014–2016 Biennium Budget legislation:  
 
Health Facility Licensing: Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, the 
document required under KRS 216B.015(28) [the State Health Plan] shall 
contain a utilization-based need methodology which accounts for all sites of 
service in the review of applications proposing the establishment of a facility to be 
licensed under 902 KAR 20:106 [ASCs]. 
 
H.B. 235, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014), http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statrev/ACTS2014rs/0117.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3XXM-NC24]. 
324 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 59 (2015). 
325 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 33 (2015). 
326 See 2015 Annual Report: Cancer Deaths, AMERICA’S HEALTH RANKINGS, 
http://www.americashealthrankings.org/explore/2015-annual-report/measure/cancerdeaths/state/KY 
[https://perma.cc/AME2-V7JK] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (ranking Kentucky 50th among states in 
cancer deaths based on three-year average, age-adjusted number of deaths attributed to cancer per 
100,000 population). 
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demonstrating a projected need for a certain number of services.327 While the 
revised plan maintains that numerical formula, it also adds a specific provision 
deeming applications from entities certified as Academic Comprehensive Cancer 
Centers consistent with the plan.328 For example, under this new provision the 
University of Kentucky Markey Cancer Center, a National Cancer Institute 
designated entity,329 has a smoother pathway to offer its services in additional areas 
of the state.330 In this way, Kentuckians may be able to stay closer to home to 
receive cancer therapy. And finally, while MRI was not removed from the State 
Health Plan following objections from stakeholders, a new provision was added to 
the plan allowing for addition of new MRI services if the applicant demonstrates 
that the new service is consistent with accreditation requirements of the American 
College of Radiology.331 
 
vi. Lessons Learned on the Relevance of Certificate of Need Programs in the  
Post–ACA Environment: Promoting Modernization of  
State Healthcare Delivery Systems 
 
The question of the role of CON programs in the new healthcare world is not 
new. As described in Part III above, others have questioned the value of CON 
programs in view of shifting payment models and changing delivery landscapes. 
And in the post-ACA era, these questions are magnified to a considerable degree, 
as some have noted. For example, Pamela Smith considered whether the 
Community Health Needs Assessment required of hospitals under ACA (in which 
hospitals must document their community impact as part of retaining their tax-
exempt status)332 should be combined with need assessments conducted pursuant to 
state CON programs, thereby saving money, time, and personnel resources.333 And 
if HHS retains its commitment to value-based payment following the Obama 
                                                                                                                 
327 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 48 (2013). 
328 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 52 (2015). 
329 See National Cancer Institute Designation, UK HEALTHCARE: MARKEY CANCER CTR., 
http://ukhealthcare.uky.edu/Markey/NCI/ [https://perma.cc/3LQX-3TBS] (last visited Nov. 13, 
2016). 
330 See generally Find a Cancer Center, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
https://www.cancer.gov/research/nci-role/cancer-centers/find#Kentucky [https://perma.cc/WVN9-
JC3W] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (showing that the Markey Cancer Center is the only NCI 
designated center in Kentucky). 
331 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 49–51 (2015). 
332 26 U.S.C. § 501(r) (2016). 
333 Pamela C. Smith & Kelly Noe, Is the Community Health Needs Assessment Replacing the 
Certificate of Need?, J. HEALTHCARE FIN., June/July 2014, at 1, 3–6. 
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administration, which seems likely,334 the need for modernization of CON laws to 
enable providers to adapt to the new environment will only increase. 
The call for full-scale repeal of CON programs has largely been unsuccessful 
and seems likely to continue to fall on deaf ears among legislators in the states that 
retain CON laws. A more successful strategy for health-oriented policymakers and 
stakeholders is to embrace CON programs as an additional regulatory tool to drive 
systematic change in healthcare delivery systems. The ability of healthcare 
providers to respond to economic incentives is well documented,335 and although 
response varies depending on the design and strength of the incentive, the 
introduction of a new, high-quality competitor into a market is undoubtedly a 
powerful incentive for existing providers.336 And while admittedly, healthcare is not 
a normal market,337 there is no reason to believe that healthcare providers will be 
unresponsive to incentives to expand their businesses into new geographic areas or 
service lines.  
To be clear, the requirement that healthcare providers demonstrate the quality 
of the services they intended to provide as part of the CON application process is 
not novel. Indeed, many states have quality requirements as part of their 
programs.338 However, Kentucky appears to be the first state to include explicit 
preferences for those providers who meet objective quality metrics or participate in 
value-based payment models.339 And although these reforms have been in effect 
only since late 2015 and are subject to change by a new gubernatorial 
                                                                                                                 
334 In a rare bipartisan move in 2015, Congress passed the Medicare Access & CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”) to significantly reform Medicare payment, shifting incentives 
to reward providers who participate in value-based payment programs. Medicare Access & CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87, 91–98, 105–07, 145 (2015). 
335 See, e.g., Kevin Quinn, The 8 Basic Payment Methods in Healthcare, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 300, 300 (2015). 
336 See, e.g., Anne Saker, St. Elizabeth Wages Battle over Christ Surgicenter, CINCINNATI POST 
ENQUIRER, June 2, 2016, at A1 (describing fight between existing provider in Northern Kentucky and 
Ohio hospital seeking to enter the market). 
337 See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1. 
338 See, e.g., Certificate of Need (CON) Program Summary, ALASKA DEP’T HEALTH & SOC. 
SERVS., http://dhss.alaska.gov/dhcs/pages/certificateofneed/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/783H-
M6HM] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016); see also CON-Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGIS. (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6NJA-QDAZ] (referencing specific state CON statutes). 
339 However, as part of its State Innovation Model Awards, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services is providing additional incentive for states to consider how they can align their regulatory 
authorities, such as certificate of need to reinforce accountable care and delivery system transformation. 
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION, C.F.D.A. NO. 93.624, STATE INNOVATION 
MODELS: FUNDING FOR MODEL DESIGN AND TESTING ASSISTANCE (2012), 
https://innovation.cms.gov/files/x/stateinnovation_foa.pdf [https://perma.cc/86UE-2WTF]. Indeed, as 
a State Innovation Model Design Award grantee, Kentucky included in its final Model Design an intent 
to leverage its regulatory authority, including the certificate of need program, to promote a move toward 
delivery system transformation. Kentucky State Innovation Model (SIM), KY. CABINET FOR HEALTH 
& FAM. SERVS., http://www.chfs.ky.gov/ohp/sim [https://perma.cc/3F9W-EQ3B] (last updated Nov. 
1, 2016).  
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administration, this novel approach to CON appears to be leading to expansion of 
higher-quality services into new areas and service lines. Indeed, since Kentucky’s 
new State Health Plan has become effective, many new providers have applied and 
received approval to deliver services, and others are still navigating the process.340 
Over time, it is reasonable to expect that patients will gravitate to higher quality 
providers and that existing providers will at least attempt to improve the quality of 
the services they deliver in order to retain their existing market share. In this way, a 
rising tide may lift all boats in the healthcare delivery system. Similarly, the 
possibility of the expansion of service lines and into new geographic areas for 
participation in value-based payment models, particularly when layered on top of 
existing (and ever–increasing) federal pressure to participate in those models, 
should incentivize at least some providers to embrace the changing landscape rather 
than resist it. If that occurs, CON may regain a valuable role in shaping the 
healthcare delivery system rather than serving primarily as an anti–competitive relic 
whose repeal is prevented by political inertia and entrenched incumbents.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Certificate of need programs were conceived in a healthcare environment that is 
essentially unrecognizable today. Every aspect of the healthcare landscape has 
changed dramatically, from healthcare delivery systems to payment structures to the 
insurance coverage models. These changes have been particularly magnified in the 
past five years as a result of the enactment and implementation of the ACA. The 
historical rationales in support of CON programs seem particularly anachronistic in 
today’s rapidly changing healthcare landscape, and critics rightly observe that the 
persistence of CON laws has the potential to slow necessary change in healthcare 
delivery systems. Already, healthcare consumes approximately 17.5% of the U.S. 
GDP,341 and there is almost no evidence that CON laws have slowed that rise, and 
considerable evidence that CON programs may contribute to increased cost, lower 
quality, and foregone opportunities for market forces to incentivize the provision of 
more efficient services. Nonetheless, CON laws persist for various reasons, not 
least among them the power of entrenched healthcare interests in states with CON 
programs and the resulting political inertia that prevents repeal or significant 
modification of the programs. 
                                                                                                                 
340 See, e.g., Certificate of Need Newsletter, OFF. OF HEALTH POL’Y (Ky. Cabinet for Health & 
Fam. Servs., Frankfort, Ky.), Dec. 17, 2015, at 1, 4–15, chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/FA3880A8-8E43-
4D8D-ABD3-F7EB0478B061/0/DEC2015.doc [https://perma.cc/PDS4-SYQD]. 
341 National Health Expenditures 2014 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TBQ-B6VD] (last 
visited Nov 3, 2016). 
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Kentucky was widely recognized as among the most successful states in its 
implementation of ACA.342 As part of its implementation efforts, the 
Commonwealth undertook a thorough review of its CON program and identified 
opportunities to modify the program to create opportunities for providers who 
embrace rather than resist efficient changes in care delivery systems and value-
based payment models, including use of electronic medical records, participation in 
the Commonwealth’s health information exchange, attainment of objective quality 
standards under federal provider rating systems such as Medicare Hospital 
Compare, and participation in federally supported value-based payment programs. 
While it remains to be seen how a new gubernatorial administration will 
implement these reforms, and whether there will remain sufficient political will to 
retain them, these reforms may offer insight to additional states as they consider 
whether and how to reform their own CON programs. Indeed, rather than being a 
persistent nuisance that must be tolerated and worked around because there is no 
political will to change the status quo, it may be possible for a modernized CON 
program to serve as an additional regulatory tool for states seeking to nudge their 
healthcare providers into fuller engagement in the post-Affordable Care Act 
healthcare landscape. 
 
Table 1: Regulated CON Service by State343 
 
Regulated Services Number of 
States 
States, Districts & Commonwealth 
Acute Hospital Beds 28 AL, AK, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL, 
IA, KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO, 
NV, NJ, NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, 
VA, WA, WV, DC 
Air Ambulance 5 +DC AL, ME, MA, MI, VT, DC 
Ambulance Services, 
Ground 
(generally not counted 
as a CON state) 
1  AZ 
                                                                                                                 
342 See, e.g., Samantha Artiga, et al., Implementation of the ACA in Kentucky: Lessons Learned to 
Date and the Potential Effects of Future Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 2016), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-implementation-of-the-aca-in-kentucky-lessons-learned-to-
date-and-the-potential-effects-of-future-changes [https://perma.cc/HEC6-UQJR]. 
343 Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/T4UX-
8ME3]. 
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Ambulatory Surgical 
Centers (ASC) 
27 AL, AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, IL, IA, 
KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, MT, 
NV, NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, 
WA, WV, DC 
Burn Care 11 AL, HI, ME, MD, NJ, NY, NC, 
TN, VT, WA, DC 
Cardiac 
Catheterization 
26 AL, AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, IL, IA, 
KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO, NJ, 
NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA, 
WV, DC 
Computed 
Tomography (CT) 
Scanners 
13 AK, CT, HI, ME, MI, MO, NY, 
NC, RI, VT, VA, WV, DC 
Gamma Knives 15 AL, AK, GA, HI, ME, MA, MI, 
MS, MO, NC, RI, SC, VT, VA, DC 
Home Health 18 AL, AR, GA, HI, KY, MD, MS, 
MT, NJ, NY, NC, SC, TN, VT, 
WA, WV, DC 
Hospice 18 AL, AR, CT, FL, HI, KY, MD, MS, 
NY, NC, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT, 
WA, WV, DC 
Intermediate Care 
Facilities/Mental 
Retardation 
(ICF/MR) 
22 AR, FL, GA, HI, IL, IA, KY, LA, 
MD, MS, MO, MT, NV, NJ, NC, 
OK, SC, TN, VT, VA, WV, WI 
Long Term Acute 
Care (LTAC) 
26 +DC AL, AK, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL, 
IA, KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO, 
NJ, NC, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, 
WA, WV, DC 
Lithotripsy 14 +DC AK, DE, GA, HI, ME, MA, MI, 
MO, NY, NC, SC, TN, VT, VA, 
DC 
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Nursing Home 
Beds/Long Term Care 
Beds 
36 +DC AL, AK, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, 
IL, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, 
MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NJ, NY, 
NC, OH, OK, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT, 
VA, WA, WV, WI, DC 
Medical Office 
Buildings 
1 +DC VT, DC 
Mobile Hi 
Technology (CT / 
MRI / PET, etc.) 
15 +DC AK, CT, HI, KY, ME, MI, MO, 
NY, NC, RI, SC, VT, VA, WV, DC 
Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) 
Scanners 
18 +DC AK, CT, HI, KY, ME, MA, MI, 
MS, MO, NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, 
VT, VA, WV, DC 
Neo-Natal Intensive 
Care 
23 AL, AK, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY, 
ME, MD, MA, MI, NJ, NY, NC, 
RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA, WV, 
DC 
Obstetrics Services 15 AL, AK, CT, GA, HI, IL, ME, 
MD, NY, RI, VT, VA, WA, WV, 
DC 
Open Heart Surgery 25 AL, AK, CT, GA, HI, IL, IA, KY, 
ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, NJ, NY, 
NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA, 
WV, DC 
Organ Transplants 21 AL, AK, CT, FL, HI, IL, IA, KY, 
ME, MD, MA, MI, NJ, NY, NC, 
RI, VT, VA, WA, WV, DC 
Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET) 
Scanners 
20 AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, KY, ME, 
MA, MI, MS, MO, NC, RI, SC, 
TN, VT, VA, WV, DC 
Psychiatric Services 26 AL, AK, AR, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, 
KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, NJ, 
NC, OK, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, 
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WA, WV, DC 
Radiation Therapy 23 AL, AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, IA, KY, 
ME, MA, MI, MS, MO, NY, NC, 
RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WV, DC 
Rehabilitation 25 AL, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY, ME, MD, 
MA, MS, MO, MT, NE, NJ, NY, 
NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA, 
WV, DC 
Renal Failure/Dialysis 12 AL, AK, HI, IL, ME, MS, NY, NC, 
VT, WA, WV, DC 
Assisted Living 
& Residential Care 
Facilities 
5 AR, LA, MO, NC, VT 
Subacute Services 13 AK, FL, HI, IL, NC, OK, RI, SC, 
TN, WA, WI, VT, DC 
Substance/Drug Abuse 19 AL, CT, FL, GA, HI, KY, ME, 
MD, MA, MS, MT, NC, RI, SC, 
TN, VT, WV, DC 
Swing Beds 12 AL, HI, IL, ME, MI, MS, 
MT, OR, TN, VT, WA, DC 
Ultra-Sound 4 HI, ME, VT, DC 
 
